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ABSTRACT

Lounsbury, Jeffrey

General Electric and the MilitaryIndustrial Complex, World War II-1970

This thesis examines General Electric's role within the Military-Industrial
Complex from World War II to 1970, with a particular focus on how defense work
affected General Electric’s growth during this period. The study relies heavily on two
General Electric publications, the company's annual reports and The General
Electric Monogram, and is also based on a number of secondary sources. For purposes
of analysis, this thesis has been divided into three periods: WWII-1952, 1953-1961, and
1962-1970. Each section details General Electric's work as a defense contractor,
indicates what portion of the company's total sales was from defense production, and
describes how defense research was applied to the development of consumer products.
Many scholars have justifiably criticized the Military-Industrial Complex because
it can lead to political corruption and unnecessary defense spending by the government.
However, the defense work of General Electric from World War II to 1970 was
beneficial to America in many respects. With the help of General Electric and other
defense contractors, the American government was able to provide for the nation's
security by fielding a well equipped and technologically advanced military during World
War II and the Cold War era.
General Electric's defense production from World War II to 1970 also played an
important role in facilitating the growth of the company. Not only was defense
production a steady source of income for General Electric, it also gave the company
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inroads into space research, jet engine production, and the design and construction of
nuclear power plants, all of which would become increasingly profitable endeavors
during the 1960's. Furthermore, General Electric’s government sponsored research and
development allowed the company to apply new technologies to its consumer products.
Even so, General Electric downplayed the importance of its defense work to the success
and growth of the company. Instead, sensitive to the perception that it was profiting
excessively from government contracts, General Electric portrayed its defense production
as an act of good citizenship that contributed to America's military strength and security.

1
Throughout much of the 20th century, the United States government and
military have worked cooperatively with private enterprises in order to create the
strongest possible military force for our country. In the modern era, the government
has entrusted private enterprises and academia with the responsibility of conducting
research and developing defense products that are essential for the military.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower popularized the term “Military-Industrial
Complex” as a way to describe the relationship between the government, military,
and private enterprises. Eisenhower viewed the “Military-Industrial Complex” as a
potential threat to American society, for it promoted high levels of defense spending,
which Eisenhower believed to be detrimental to the American economy. Eisenhower
feared that the “Military-Industrial Complex” could give too much power to the
military and defense contractors, and therefore create a “garrison state.” 1 During his
farewell address on June 17, 1961, Eisenhower warned the American public that
“only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the
huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and
goals so that security and liberty may prosper together.” 2
Since Eisenhower’s speech, many historians have assessed the influence of
the Military-Industrial Complex in scholarly treatments published during the latter
half of the 20th century. For the most part, these scholars share Eisenhower’s concern
over are the effects that the Military-Industrial Complex can have on American
society.
1

James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996) p. 289.
2
Diane Ravitch, The American Reader: Words That Moved A Nation (New York: HarperCollins,
1990) p. 537.
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In examining the Military-Industrial Complex, one issue that scholars have
focused on is whether private enterprises have unfairly profited from their defense
work during periods of war. Historians also debate when the Military-Industrial
Complex came into existence in the United States, which of the three agents (military,
industry, politicians) within the Military-Industrial Complex has the most power,
what sort of role the Military-Industrial Complex plays during times of peace and
what impact it has on the American economy.
In this paper, I have first summarized the perspectives of various scholars on
the Military-Industrial Complex, and have then examined the role played by General
Electric in defense production during the post-WWII/Cold War era. General Electric
was one of the primary companies the government relied on to conduct military
research and development during this period. Through my research, I have concluded
that from World War II through 1970, the American military, American consumers,
and General Electric itself benefited significantly from General Electric’s work as a
defense contractor. Among other things, General Electric played an important role in
atomic research, the development of radar, and the design and construction of jet
engines. These and other defense projects contributed to a strong military, while the
technology developed by General Electric had widespread application to non-military
products and services, benefiting both the company and American consumers.
My paper is divided into five chapters. The first chapter is a literature review
that describes the origins of the Military-Industrial Complex as well as the views of
various scholars on how it functions and affects American society. The following
three chapters describe General Electric’s experience as a defense contractor and
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explain how defense production affected the growth of the company. The second
chapter tracks General Electric from 1945-1952, while briefly examining the
company’s contribution to World War II mobilization. The third chapter covers 19531961, and the fourth 1962-1970. The fifth and final chapter will draw conclusions
regarding General Electric’s role within the Military-Industrial Complex, and how
defense work and commercial offshoots fueled the company’s growth.

4

I. Literature Review
A strong link between the government, military, and defense contractors was
established in America during World War II as the country mobilized to wage war
against Germany and Japan. Immediately following World War II America partially
demobilized, and government defense spending declined. During the early 1950s,
however, the close link between the government, military, and defense contractors
was renewed. The Soviet Union emerged as a nuclear superpower, and from 1950
through 1953, the United States and democratic forces squared off against communist
enemies in the Korean War, which increased Cold War tensions. Political scientist
Samuel Huntington explains that during this period, there was a “perceived need to
deter, and if necessary, to repel Soviet or Chinese aggression.” 3
Throughout the Korean War, most defense work was done by large companies
such as General Electric for whom defense production was only a portion of their
business. After the war, however, companies solely devoted to military production
formed as a result of new weapons developments. These companies were extremely
dependent upon the Department of Defense as a buyer of their goods. In order to
remain profitable, they needed the Department of Defense to consistently purchase
their military products, regardless of whether the country was at war. 4
President Eisenhower, who served as president from 1953 to 1960, fully
understood the pressure this “Military-Industrial Complex” created for heightened

3

Omer L. Carey, The Military-Industrial Complex and United States Foreign Policy (Pullman:
Washington State UP, 1969) p. 9.
4
Ibid, p. 7.
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defense spending, particularly in the context of the Cold War. Although the term
“Military-Industrial Complex” was not coined by Eisenhower until 1961, the idea that
a Military-Industrial Complex exists in the United States has its origins in the work of
C. Wright Mills, a professor of sociology at Columbia University. In The Power Elite,
published in 1965, Mills expressed his thoughts on the relationship between
government, military, and private industry. He argued that a “power elite” existed in
the United States at the national level, comprised of high officials within the
government and military, and the top executives of large corporations. 5 According to
Mills, “the power elite” were in positions that enabled them to “transcend the
ordinary environments of ordinary men and women; they are in positions to make
decisions having major consequences.” 6 The majority of its members were thought to
be upper class, native-born, from urban areas and the east coast, Protestant, and
highly educated. 7
Mills describes the evolution of the “power elite” through American history
by dividing it into five epochs. During the first epoch (from the American Revolution
until 1797), “social life, economic institutions, military establishment, and political
order coincided,” making it easy for elite men to have a profound impact on all of
these institutions. 8 In the second epoch, decentralization of American society caused
economic, political, and military power to “fit more loosely into the great scatter of

5
6
7
8

C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford UP, 1956) p. 7.
Ibid, pp. 1-2.
Ibid, p. 279.
Ibid, p. 270.
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the American social structure.” 9 Mills characterizes the third epoch (from 1866 to
World War I) as being a period in which economic elites had great influence over
government and military institutions. 10 During the fourth epoch (New Deal to the
conclusion of WWII) the New Deal removed power from the economic elite, which
effectively put the government, military, and private enterprises on an even playing
field. 11
In the fifth and final epoch (post-WWII to 1956), Mills feared that the
politicians within the “power elite” were being dominated by corporate and military
men, claiming, “not politicians, but corporate executives, sit with the military and
plan the organization of war effort.” 12 Mills considered this to be undemocratic in the
sense that these corporate executives were not elected by the American population,
and therefore should not have the ability to make decisions that affect the entire
population. Furthermore, Mills feared that many corporate and military men within
the “power elite” would not be held accountable for their decisions. Given that the
military valued the opinions of corporate executives more than those of politicians,
Mills worried for the general welfare of the American population. Mills’ idea of the
“power elite” is quite similar to the concept of the Military-Industrial Complex, and
the concerns he expresses over the excessive influence of corporate executives and
military officials are synonymous to those expressed by Eisenhower.
Various perspectives of the Military-Industrial Complex in the postWWII/Cold War era are provided in Omer Carey’s The Military-Industrial Complex
9

Ibid, p. 270.
Ibid, pp. 271-272.
11
Ibid, pp. 272-273.
12
Ibid, p. 276.
10
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and United States Foreign Policy. Carey, a former professor at Washington State
University, compiles five scholarly papers on the Military-Industrial Complex into
one text. The five authors included in this text are Samuel P. Huntington, Walter
Adams, Murray L. Weidenbaum, Ralph E. Lapp, and Patrick M. Morgan. These
papers were presented during the spring of 1969 at the World Affairs Institute
Committee, which was held as a forum for discussion on the Military-Industrial
Complex. The Military-Industrial Complex was a topic of interest in 1969 because
the United States was involved in both the Vietnam and the Cold Wars, and the role
of certain corporations in producing defense materials was especially controversial.
For example, Dow Chemicals’ creation of napalm for the Air Force caused protest at
college campuses across the country. The authors of the papers included in this text
offer a wide variety of opinions on the Military-Industrial Complex. Carey does not
share his personal opinion, and there is no evidence that he framed these papers in
any particular manner.
Huntington appears to champion the military research and production done by
private corporations under the guidance of the government during the Cold War era.
He explains that following World War II, the United States continued to focus on
strengthening its military power, much in part to Cold War concerns. During the
Kennedy-Johnson-McNamara years, innovations made by defense contractors such as
General Electric “tremendously enhanced American military power, strategic and
conventional, and made possible not only continued American superiority in the
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nuclear arms race but also American involvement in a major overseas war without
recourse to general mobilization.” 13
Adams believes that governmental action was able to dictate the behavior of
both the military and private enterprises during the post-WWII/Cold War era. By
supporting the international weapons race, the government generated a demand for
the production of technologically advanced weaponry. 14 Adams states, “The
government not only permits and facilitates the entrenchment of private power but
serves as its fountainhead.” 15 This idea directly contrasts with Mills’ thesis, which is
that the government is subordinate to private corporations and the military within the
“power elite”.
In her analysis of the Military-Industrial Complex in the post-WWII/Cold War
era, Weidenbaum provides suggestions as to how public policy can prevent particular
corporations and their executives from unfairly reaping war profits. 16 Weidenbaum
believes that the primary way in which government-industrial abuses can be deterred
is by “changing governmental procurement policies and practices so as to halt the
erosion of the basic entrepreneurial character of the firms that undertake large-scale
developmental programs for the federal establishment and to reorient these firms to
serving private as well as public requirements.” 17 Although Weidenbaum
acknowledges the importance of the military in keeping the peace, she expresses

13
14
15
16
17

Carey, p. 1.
Ibid, p. 17.
Ibid, p. 17.
Ibid, p. 2.
Ibid, p. 38.
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concern over the threat that the Military-Industrial Complex poses to society if not
managed properly. In this sense, her opinion is quite similar to that of Mills.
Lapp supports the basic argument initially proposed by Huntington that
military influence has continued to grow during the Cold War. Furthermore, he
stresses the ways in which the government, military, and private enterprises continue
to be intertwined in the post-WWII/Cold War era. 18 In fact, Lapp goes as far as to
claim that the Military-Industrial Complex was a “Second government existing
almost independently within our democracy.” 19 Finally, Morgan places the MilitaryIndustrial Complex in a larger perspective by explaining that other countries besides
the United States have also had difficulty keeping tabs on the relationship between
government, military, and private industry. 20 Morgan speculates in his paper that the
Military-Industrial Complex is not necessarily as influential as many believe it to be.
These papers by Lapp, Weidenbaum and Morgan are each consistent with
certain arguments put forth by Mills in The Power Elite. Mills identifies the close
relationship between government, military and private enterprises (Lapp), stresses the
importance of preventing particular individuals and corporations from benefiting
from the Military-Industrial Complex (Weidenbaum), and acknowledges that other
countries besides the United States are affected by the Military-Industrial Complex
(Morgan).
Most historians believe that the Military-Industrial Complex began in the
United States during the World War II era, when private industry cooperated with the
18
19
20

Ibid, p. 27.
Ibid, p. 43.
Ibid, p. 35.
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government to mobilize for an unprecedented war effort. However, according to Paul
Koistinen, the author of The Military-Industrial Complex: A Historical Perspective,
the foundation for the Military-Industrial Complex was laid during World War I. In
support of this claim, Koistinen explains that military officers and members of the
War Industries Board (composed of high ranking businessmen) shared the
responsibility of making wartime decisions during World War I.
Koistinen agrees with Mills that a “power elite” existed in the United States,
but the two scholars disagree somewhat as to how the power elite functions.
Koistinen argues, “a power elite made up of business, banking, and industrial leaders,
dominates the government and thus controls the military.” 21 Koistinen is clearly of
the opinion that private corporations hold more power than the government and the
military within the “power elite,” which contrasts with Mills’ belief that corporate
and military executives together control politicians within the “power elite.” In both
Koistinen’s and Mills’ opinions, the government is subverted by excessive influence
from private corporations, which makes the American society undemocratic.
Koistinen is generally critical of the effects that the Military-Industrial
Complex has on both civil-military relations and the business-military partnership.
He agrees with Mills’ belief that in America, there is “socialism for the rich; free
enterprise for the poor.” 23 Koistinen believes that one of the reasons the MilitaryIndustrial Complex exists in the United States is because there has never been a

21

Paul A.C. Koistinen, The Military Industrial Complex: A Historical Perspective (New York:
Praeger, 1980) p. 2.
22
Ibid, p. 2.
23
Ibid, p. 15.

22
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widespread radical movement driven by the lower class. 24 According to Koistinen,
this has caused elite leadership to be “rather consistently shortsighted in terms of its
own and the nation’s larger interests.” 25 As a result, Koistinen explains that reform
movements in the United States have only made minimal changes to the high level of
poverty, as well as the social welfare, transportation, communication, and economic
systems. 26 Given these conclusions, Koistinen supports Mills’ argument that the
Military-Industrial Complex has a harmful effect on society.
In contrast to Koistinen, Gregory Hooks takes the more common viewpoint
that the Military-Industrial Complex came into existence in the United States during
the World War II era. In Forging the Military-Industrial Complex: World War II's
Battle of the Potomac, Hooks focuses is on the economic mobilization that took place
during World War II and the postwar impact of this mobilization. It is his belief that
the defense spending necessary for World War II mobilization allowed the United
States to transition from the Great Depression to the booming 1940s. 27 Hooks also
describes the ways in which World War II mobilization affected Cold War
mobilization. He argues, “The World War II mobilization provided the material
foundations for a vast postwar industrial planning effort centered in the Pentagon and
devoted to national security goods.” 28 In this sense, Hooks believes that the success
of World War II mobilization provided the incentive and set the pattern for the

24

Ibid, p. 15.
Ibid, p. 15.
26
Ibid, p. 15.
27
Gregory Hooks, Forging the Military-Industrial Complex: World War II’s Battle of the Potomac
(Urbana: University of Illinois, 1991) pp. 2-3.
28
Ibid, p. 6.
25
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government, private corporations, and the military to work cooperatively in producing
military goods in the postwar era.
Hooks goes on to claim that World War II mobilization led to the rise of the
“national security state” and laid the material foundation for the Military-Industrial
Complex. In a “national security state,” according to Hooks, the military is the most
powerful entity within society and therefore controls the direction taken by the
country. The private firms involved in World War II mobilization were stronger
following the war, yet they continued to be under the influence of the United States
military.
Hooks is wary of the power of the Pentagon in the post-WWII era, and
believes that it is difficult for democracy to flourish with the military holding the
most power in American society. He argues, “The state’s authority and ability to
shape economic activity presently monopolized by the Pentagon must be transferred
to, and adapted by, new civilian agencies that are both more democratic and more
concerned with society’s needs.” 29 Hooks clearly believes that the power of the
military within the Military-Industrial complex must be curbed by elected
government officials, whose job it is to protect democratic principles and the needs of
the general population. Hooks’ warnings about the power of the Pentagon and the
dangers posed by the Military-Industrial Complex are very similar to the warnings
given by President Eisenhower in his farewell speech.
Hooks concludes that the private firms involved in World War II were clients
of the Pentagon during and after World War II, and were not self-governing
29

Ibid, p. 275.
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entities. 30 While Hooks applauds Mills’ work on the “power elite”, he views the
military as having the most power within the Military-Industrial Complex in the postWWII era. This conclusion is at odds with Mills’ argument, which is that private
corporations and the military were equals within “the power elite”. Speaking of Mills,
Hooks remarks, “I find his insights into the structure and dynamics of power in the
U.S. and on the importance of World War II to be instructive.” 31
Stuart Brandes, a former professor of history at the University of WisconsinRock Country, studies the ethics of whether individuals or groups can rightly profit
from war in Warhogs: A History of War Profits in America. If the answer to this
question is yes, he asks to what degree, and how does one decide which groups or
individuals should profit? 32 In an exploration of this issue starting with the American
Revolution, Brandes found that there is a long history of profiting from war. When a
particular country is victorious in war, the government, military, and private
enterprises all benefit. The government and military are commended for the planning
behind the successful military engagement, and private enterprises make large profits
from the their production of wartime goods.

33

Even if this war was unjust or

unnecessary, private corporations as well as the nation’s economy gain from wartime
mobilization.
In Brandes’ view, the Military-Industrial Complex can unnecessarily promote
war and unfair profits for corporations involved in wartime mobilization. Even during
30

Ibid, p. 5.
Ibid, p. 4.
32
Stuart Brandes, Warhogs: A History Of War Profits In America (University Of Kentucky Press,
1997) p. 3.
33
Ibid, p. 5.
31
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times of peace, the American government has been accused of unnecessarily
subsidizing private enterprises’ production of defense materials with the hope of
stimulating the economy. 34 Brandes clearly recognizes the harmful effects that the
Military-Industrial Complex can potentially have on society, and therefore is in
agreement with the concerns expressed by Mills and others.
Brandes claims that World War II was the first mobilization where the
American government tried to learn from its past experiences with defense
contractors profiting excessively from war, or “profiteering”. 35 According to Brandes,
the government did not properly manage the level of profits earned by private
corporations involved in World War I mobilization. 36 Earning profits during wartime
periods was unavoidable; the government simply needed to find a fair way to limit
these profits. 37 Brandes believes that World War II was the first time that the
American government made a conscious effort not to allow individual businesses to
profit excessively from war. 38 Unlike Koistinen, Brandes does not make the claim
that private corporations or the military were dominating the government within the
Military-Industrial Complex. Brandes credits Franklin Delano Roosevelt for being
committed to working out ways of spreading the wealth acquired from victory more
evenly. 39

34
35
36
37
38
39

Ibid, p. 5.
Ibid, p. 9.
Ibid, p. 7.
Ibid, pp. 6-7.
Ibid, p. 7.
Ibid, p. 9.
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Now that various perspectives on the Military-Industrial Complex have been
summarized, the remaining portion of the literature review will focus on General
Electric. The role played by General Electric in defense production during WWII and
the post-WWII era has been discussed by various writers. General Electric was one of
the primary private enterprises that conducted research and produced goods
pertaining to defense during this period. The United States government funded this
research and production for the benefit of the military through defense contracts, that
were, at least to some extent, secured through lobbying efforts by companies seeking
this work.
John Anderson Miller’s Men and Volts at War; The Story of General Electric
in World War II, which was published directly after World War II, details the work
undertaken by General Electric for the United States military during the war. Miller’s
book is largely a celebratory account; he “tells the story of how the largest electrical
manufacturing company mobilized all its experience, skill, and resourcefulness for
America’s war effort on land, at sea, and in the air.” 40 He explains that General
Electric not only helped to manufacture many wartime necessities (weaponry, ships,
planes, tanks and motors), but also made incredible technological advancements that
strengthened the war effort. The speed at which private companies such as General
Electric were able to manufacture war materials was greatly underestimated by the
Axis powers, which gave the Allies a significant advantage. 41 According to Miller,

40

John A. Miller, Men and Volts at War; The Story of General Electric in World War II (New York:
Whittlesey House, 1947) p. vi.
41
Ibid, p. v.
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the assistance provided by General Electric during World War II played an integral
role in allowing the Allies to triumph. 42
Major A. Johnson, a longtime electronics engineer for General Electric, also
details the contributions made by General Electric during the World War II era in
Progress in Defense and Space: A History of the Aerospace Group of the General
Electric Company. Although Progress in Defense And Space was written several
decades after Men and Volts at War, it shares the same celebratory tone towards
General Electric. Johnson glorifies the accomplishments of General Electric during
the World War II era; the company worked on developing radar, creating jet engines,
furthering ballistic missile technology, and helping to develop the atomic bomb.

43

As

a result of the United States’ success in World War II and the significant amount of
funding received from the government, General Electric had become one of
America’s most powerful corporations at the conclusion of the war.
James Deakin’s The Lobbyists provides insight into General Electric’s
lobbying efforts for defense contracts. Deakin describes the ins and outs of lobbying
by defense businesses in Washington during the late 1950s and into the 1960s. He
explains that it is incredibly difficult to pinpoint the number of individuals lobbying
for a particular defense contractor because of loopholes in laws requiring lobbyists to
identify themselves. Given these loopholes, Deakin concludes that there was
essentially “no legal requirement that defense lobbyists seeking military contracts

42

Ibid, pp. v-vii.
Major A. Johnson, Progress In Defense And Space: A History Of The Aerospace Group Of The
General Electric Company (New York: M.A. Johnson, 1993) p. 25.
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register as lobbyists.” 44 It is therefore impossible to put a figure on the number of
individuals lobbying for defense contracts on behalf of General Electric. 45
Even so, Deakin details the lobbying arrangements used by General Electric to
the best of his ability. He explains that General Electric had an office in Washington
headed by Laurence I. Wood, who was the company’s vice president in charge of
corporate affairs. Of the six employees in Wood’s office, three of them were
registered lobbyists. Two of these individuals dealt with General Electric’s legislative
work, while the third was the company’s Washington counsel. General Electric also
had a defense programs division located in Washington, which was responsible for
coordinating the company’s defense contract work. Furthermore, Deakin notes that
General Electric had access to the White House through its relationships with
Washington law firms. For example, the company worked with Clifford and Miller,
headed by Clark M. Clifford, who was special counsel to President Truman, personal
advisor to President Johnson and chairman of the C.I.A.’s Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board. 46
Gordon Adams’ The Politics Of Defense Contracting: The Iron Triangle
elaborates on the lobbying efforts of companies seeking to earn defense contracts
from the government during the 1960s and 1970s. The Iron Triangle focuses on
revealing the lobbying operations of eight defense contractors: Boeing, General
Dynamics, Grumman, Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas, Northrop, Rockwell

44
45
46

James Deakin, The Lobbyists (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1966) p. 121.
Ibid, p. 121.
Ibid, pp. 121-122.

18
International, and United Technologies. 47 Although General Electric is not one of the
companies examined in great detail by The Iron Triangle, the book is still a valuable
source for learning about General Electric’s lobbying efforts, given that General
Electric surely followed the same lobbying strategies as the above mentioned defense
contractors.
In a similar fashion to The Lobbyists, The Iron Triangle reveals that existing
loopholes pertaining to lobbying allowed defense contractors to exert significant
influence on the government without having to publicly disclose their lobbing
activities. The 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act stipulated that individuals must
register as lobbyists if lobbying is their “principal activity.” Adams explains that
many individuals who lobbied for defense contracts successfully avoided registering
by claiming that lobbying was not their “principal activity.” Furthermore, the 1946
Legislative Reorganization Act assumes that all lobbying efforts are directed towards
Congress. However, Adams reveals that “Most registered lobbyists spend as much
time and energy lobbying before the executive branch as before the legislative
branch. Most lobbyists try to influence decisions at all stages.” Adams concludes his
discussion of lobbying by asserting that much of the lobbying activity in Washington
is never disclosed to the public, and that lobbyists wish to remain hidden from the
public eye. In fact, one General Electric lobbyist is quoted as saying, “Visibility is the
last thing I need.” 48

47

Gordon Adams, The Politics Of Defense Contracting: The Iron Triangle (New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction Books, 1982) p. 7.
48
Ibid, p. 135.
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Thomas F. O’Boyle’s At Any Cost offers a critical perspective of General
Electric and its role in the Military-Industrial Complex. O’Boyle focuses on General
Electric during the 1980s and 1990s while under the leadership of Chairman and CEO
Jack Welsh. Although the United States was not fighting a full-fledged war during
this period, the government continued to spend a great deal of money on defense
contracts because of continuing Cold War hostilities. O’Boyle acknowledges that
Welch was a very successful businessman, yet he disapproves of the manner in which
Welch ran General Electric. O’Boyle claims that under Welch’s guidance, General
Electric was “a company where greed played a powerful role” and that the company
was “managed by threat and intimidation rather than encouragement.” 49
O’Boyle reveals that during the 1980s and 1990s General Electric was guilty
of more instances of Pentagon fraud than any other military contractor, and highlights
lawsuits that detail illegal and unsafe practices that took place in General Electric’s
nuclear business. 50 O’Boyle even goes as far to say that General Electric “abandoned
the old-fashioned business values that made this the American century—loyalty, trust,
respect, teamwork, hard work, compassion—in a feverish pursuit of the quick
buck.” 51 At Any Cost provides valuable insight as to how General Electric functioned
within the Military-Industrial Complex during the later portion of the Cold War era.
Bringing GE To Light: How General Electric Shapes Nuclear Weapons
Policies For Profits is also extremely critical of General Electric’s role within the

49

Thomas F. O’Boyle, At Any Cost: Jack Welch, General Electric, and the Pursuit of Profit (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998) p. 15.
50
Ibid, p. 13.
51
O’Boyle, p. 16.
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Military-Industrial Complex during the 1980s. Written by the Infant Formula Action
Campaign (INFACT), a non-profit agency that aims to protect the American public
from abuses committed by private corporations, Bringing GE To Light accuses
General Electric of “promoting the nuclear weapons build-up and then producing
these weapons of mass destruction at public expense for private profit.” 52 INFACT
claims that the leaders of General Electric have gained significant influence over
decisions affecting the country’s national security and that their corporate interests
are hidden from the public. 53 Furthermore, the report informs readers that General
Electric was proven guilty of overcharging the government on military contracts in
1985. 54
Bringing GE To Light highlights the influence that General Electric has within
the government’s legislative and executive branches. INFACT cites the company’s
relationship with President Ronald Reagan, a former spokesmen for the company, as
a way through which the company manipulates national defense policy. 55 INFACT
claims that during the 1980s, under Reagan’s presidency, General Electric’s nuclear
weapons prime contract awards increased from $2.2 billion in 1980 to $6.8 billion in
1986. 56 Furthermore, INFACT’s report explains that former GE lobbyists head the
Committee on the Present Danger, which “conducts public information campaigns on
military issues to warn policy makers and the public of the growing Soviet military
52

Infant Formula Action Coalition, Bringing GE To Light: How General Electric Shapes Nuclear
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strength and the need to match it.” 57 INFACT warns the American public not to be
deceived into thinking that General Electric is “simply doing a patriotic duty by
providing for the national defense;” the report asserts that the power of defense
contractors such as General Electric presents a legitimate threat to democracy in the
United States. 58 INFACT hopes that, upon becoming aware of General Electric’s
efforts to inflate defense spending for its own benefit, the American public will
boycott General Electric products and consequently weaken the company’s influence
on the government.
In the following chapters of my thesis, I cite a number of the literary works
summarized above, as well as various other secondary sources. In addition, there are
two primary sources of information that I rely on. The first is the General Electric
Annual Reports, which provide yearly updates on the growth and outlook of the
company. Each report contains a statement from the company’s president, a balance
sheet that tracks the company’s sales and earnings, and a “yearbook” that highlights
the achievements within each of the company’s industry segments. The second source
is The General Electric Monogram, which was published on a monthly basis
specifically for General Electric managers and members of the sales staff. The
Monogram kept these individuals updated on events within the company so that they
could use the company’s rhetoric when interacting with potential customers.
Both of the Annual Reports and The Monogram are published by General
Electric, and therefore consistently portray a favorable image of the company.
Furthermore, General Electric had particular goals in mind when publishing these
57
58

Ibid. p. 11.
Ibid. p. 9.

22
sources, so they are no doubt biased. Even so, these two sources provide invaluable
information regarding the history of the company and its role in defense production.
My detailed studies of General Electric’s annual reports and The Monogram,
as well as my review of a number of secondary sources, lead me to believe that
General Electric's defense production from World War II through 1970 played an
essential role in strengthening America’s military and fueling the growth of the
company. In terms of strengthening America’s military, General Electric helped
develop the atomic bomb during World War II, and later built nuclear reactors to
power submarines. The company also played an important role in developing radar
and missile systems, and in designing and constructing jet engines. In terms of fueling
the company’s growth, defense production was not only a steady source of income for
General Electric, it also gave the company inroads into space research, commercial jet
engine production, and the design and construction of nuclear power plants, all of
which would become increasingly profitable endeavors during the 1960's.
Not surprisingly, in General Electric’s rhetoric in its annual reports and The
Monogram downplayed the importance of its defense work to the success and growth
of the company. Instead, General Electric portrayed its defense production as an act
of good citizenship that contributed to America's military strength and security. A
more accurate portrayal, I believe, is that General Electric’s defense work from World
War II to 1970 benefited the American military, America’s national security, and the
company itself to a significant extent.
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II. General Electric And The Military-Industrial Complex (WWII-1952)
During the period between the first and second World Wars, many Americans
came to believe that the United States should not have participated in World War I. David
Kennedy explains that “No people came to believe more emphatically than the
Americans that the Great War was an unalloyed tragedy, an unpardonably costly mistake
never to be repeated.” 59 The United States had abandoned its principle of isolationism
and sacrificed over fifty thousand soldiers in World War I in order to protect Europe from
authoritarian leaders. 60 Although the Allies were victorious, Europe “swiftly slid back
into its historic vices of authoritarian and armed rivalry, while America slid back into its
historic attitude of isolationism.” 61 To avoid another entanglement in a European conflict,
the United States began to demobilize its armed forces, and Congress enacted a series of
neutrality laws. While Germany and Japan developed into formidable military powers
during the 1930's, the United States failed to keep pace.
Consequently, when the United States entered World War II on December 7, 1941
in response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, America had virtually no army, and
American weapons were vastly inferior to the weapons of its enemies. Although the
United States had made a push for rearmament after the war in Europe began in 1939, the
country’s military forces were still lacking. Kennedy explains that World War II
mobilization was a “Herculean task after years of willful neglect of military
preparedness.” 62
Fortunately, America had tremendous industrial capacity that was quickly
59

David Kennedy, Freedom From Fear: The American People In Depression And War, 1929-1945
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999) p. 386.
60
Ibid, p. 386.
61
Ibid, p. 386.
62
Ibid, p. 476.

24
converted from peacetime use to an unprecedented production of war machinery and
weapons. 63 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt vastly increased government defense
spending during World War II; in fact, the percentage of U.S. Gross National Product
devoted to defense spending rose from 2% in 1939 to 42% in 1945. 64 This defense
spending played an essential role in lifting the United States out of the Great Depression
and remained an integral part of many states’ economies in the war’s aftermath. 65
The intense collaboration among the American government, military and private
enterprise that made World War II mobilization successful is what most historians
identify as the beginning of the Military-Industrial Complex in the United States. 66
Following the war’s conclusion, this collaboration continued because of the threat posed
by the Soviet Union and the ensuing Cold War. In the immediate post-World War II era,
President Harry Truman partially demobilized the American military and significantly
reduced the nation’s defense budget. 67 Truman also set in motion the Marshall Plan to
rebuild Europe, as well as the strategy of containment, which he hoped would help to
maintain a global balance of power with the Soviet Union.68 Truman believed the
Marshall Plan and the containment strategy provided an economic approach to dealing
with the potential threat of the Soviet Union rather than using military force. 69 Truman
argued that “Only a national emergency could justify a major escalation of U.S. defense
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spending.” 70
Truman continued to restrain defense spending until 1950, when he reversed
course for two reasons. The first was North Korea’s invasion of South Korea, and the
second was heightened concern over Soviet Union’s emergence as a nuclear
superpower. 71 Even so, Truman was reluctant to drastically increase defense spending; he
“favored a gradual and balanced military buildup, stressing defense mobilization
capabilities over standing forces.” 72 Ultimately, however, Truman and his administration
became convinced that it was necessary to develop even more sophisticated and powerful
nuclear weapons and delivery systems to deter a Soviet nuclear attack. 73 General Electric
and various other large defense contractors played important roles in developing these
weapon systems as well as conventional weapons used in the Korean War.
This chapter examines General Electric’s defense work and the spillover effects
of defense research on the company’s commercial production from World War II through
1952. During World War II, General Electric became primarily a defense contractor, and
the United States government remained a staple of General Electric’s business in the
immediate post-war era. This defense work and its spillover effects helped to facilitate
the company’s transition to a peacetime economy. Most significantly, the government
entrusted General Electric with a key role in developing peacetime uses of atomic energy,
which was an extension of the company’s work on the Manhattan Project.
At the outset of the 1950s, the Korean War and Cold War rearmament
necessitated an increase in defense mobilization. In order to serve the government, the
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military, and its shareholders, General Electric’s defense production and research
increased dramatically between 1950-1952. General Electric championed its defense
production through advertisements and company publications, and portrayed itself as a
selfless company doing its part to protect national security.
I believe that from World War II through the early 1950s, a close relationship
existed between the government, military, and General Electric in which all three parties
greatly benefited from one another. General Electric, in particular, experienced
substantial growth during World War II because of its defense business. General Electric
glorified the importance of its defense work in company publications, but resisted
accusations that its defense work provided the company with great profits. Then, during
the post-war period, General Electric continued to work on defense projects, but more
importantly was able to develop new peacetime products and services based on
technology acquired in its defense work.
In order to present my analysis in an organized manner, I have divided the
remainder of this chapter into four sections. The first section will briefly address General
Electric’s role in World War II and how the war affected growth of the company. The
second section will detail the company’s conversion to a peacetime economy. The third
section will focus on General Electric’s role in studying atomic energy as well as the
additional research it performed on behalf of the government. The fourth and final section
describes General Electric’s role in defense mobilization between 1950 and 1952.
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World War II’s Effect on General Electric
During World War II, General Electric dedicated all of its facilities, production,
and research to defense mobilization. 74 Consumer and industrial products were put on
hold during this period so that full attention could be given to the war effort. General
Electric embraced the vital role it played in defense production between 1939 and 1945.
In an article appearing in the Monogram in 1945, General Electric President Charles E.
Wilson explains that Japan surrendered in World War II in part because of the “superior
scientific and productive power of the United States and her allies.” 75 Wilson attributed
the power of the United States in these two areas to “the hard work of countless men and
women who never heard a shot fired,” many of whom worked for General Electric. 76
Contracts between the United States government and General Electric during
World War II provided the company with millions of dollars for defense production.
General Electric’s sales quadrupled, going from $342 million in 1939 to $1.38 billion in
1945. 77 Given the deep involvement of General Electric in defense production during
World War II, it was assumed by many that the company had accumulated enormous
profits from this work. Stuart Brandes explains that it was exceptionally complicated for
government agencies to prevent corporations such as General Electric from profiting
during World War II: “Restriction of war profits proved to be a problem capable of
thwarting the best efforts of the nation’s most able and committed economic planners.” 78
Although the Roosevelt administration went too great lengths to restrict war profits,

74
75
76
77
78

“To The Stockholders of the General Electric Company,” 1945 Annual Report And Yearbook, p. 9.
“Memo: To Ourselves,” The General Electric Monogram, 1945.
Ibid
“15 Year Summary,”1953 Annual Report And Yearbook, p. 33.
Brandes, p. 250.

28
Brandes concludes that, “the average defense contractor prospered considerably during
the war, and some prospered enormously. 79 However, the Roosevelt Administration’s
anti-profiteering campaign was successful in the sense that it prevented the level of
profiteering reached during World War I.
In the case of General Electric, its sales greatly increased during World War II,
but the company denied that it earned significant profits through its wartime production.
An article appearing in The Monogram from 1946 explains that although General
Electric’s revenue increased throughout most of the war, there were twice as many
employees to be paid, more supplies to purchase, more taxes to pay, and higher
depreciation resulting from additional capital investments. 80 The article claims, “After all
these payments were made, the Company wound up with very little left to take care of
future needs.” 81 General Electric clearly wanted to avoid backlash that defense
contractors were subjected to in the post-WWI era for unfairly profiting from defense
production.
Reconversion
Following the conclusion of World War II in September 1945, with the surrender
of the Japanese forces, the United States looked to transition to a peacetime economy.
Debate raged as to whether wartime price controls, which had been instituted to
guarantee that essential goods could be purchased at a reasonable price, should be
extended into the post-war era. Lizabeth Cohen explains in A Consumer’s Republic: The
Politics Of Mass Consumption In Postwar America that the vast majority of the public
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was in favor of extending price controls until at least June of 1947. 82 Even so, price
controls were lifted on June 30, 1946, meaning that price ceilings and rent control would
no longer be applicable. 83 In the ensuing month, food prices as well as overall living
expenses significantly increased, which led to mass protests across the country against
higher prices. 84
Thus, the government effectively decided that it would not be regulating market
activities as the American economy entered the period of reconversion during the latter
half of 1946. 85 The removal of price controls had significant implications for General
Electric. Given that food prices and overall living expenses substantially increased,
customers might be less inclined to purchase consumer goods placed on the market by
General Electric. Further, the inflationary impact of lifting price control could increase
the company’s costs of production, including the wage demands of its employees.
The majority of companies that aided the United States government and military
through defense production during the war began their reconversion to a peacetime
economy with the surrender of Germany in early May of 1945. However, General
Electric could not fully begin the process of reconversion until the war was completely
over. 86 As stated in an advertisement from the Monogram, many General Electric
scientists and engineers were “engaged until final victory in finding ways to counteract
new weapons which Japan may devise and also in creating new devices for our own
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armed services.” 87 For example, General Electric scientists were still working on
developing an atomic bomb for the Manhattan Project.
In preparation for reconversion to a peacetime economy, General Electric
established a Reserve between 1942-1944 holding upwards of $15 million dollars. 88
Realizing that reconversion would be an expensive and painstaking process, General
Electric anticipated losses in earnings in the months following the conclusion of World
War II. 89 The Reserve was established in order to provide a source of funds that could be
drawn on during this difficult period.
Although losses were predicted due to reconversion, General Electric hoped that
there would be high demand for its industrial and consumer goods in the immediate postwar economy. Many of the industrial and consumer goods that had been sold by General
Electric prior to World War II were wearing down and in need of replacement. 90 Despite
the higher prices resulting from the removal of price controls, Americans were eager to
rebound from the Depression and participate in the consumer market. General Electric
believed that pent-up demand would lead to great sales in the immediate post-war era and
consequently help the company make a smooth transition into the peacetime economy. 91
Cohen explains that mass consumption in the postwar era was commonly viewed as “a
civic responsibility designed to provide full employment and improved living standards
for the rest of the nation.” 92
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General Electric began advertising its new consumer products in 1945 even
before World War II officially concluded. The company advertised its products as
improving standards of living and making life more enjoyable in order to attract
customers. For example, an advertisement from the 1945 edition of the Monogram
explains that General Electric products such as lamps, x-rays, and air conditioning are
helping people stay healthy. 93 A second advertisement from the 1945 edition of the
Monogram highlights the importance of electricity to farms, which of course are
responsible for producing the food that people need to survive. 94 General Electric
continued these marketing techniques throughout the immediate post-war era.
General Electric could not meet the production schedules it had set for itself
during the final quarter of 1945, attributing its inability to create the desired quantity of
domestic goods to difficulties resulting from reconversion.95 The company could not
obtain materials and component parts from suppliers at a fast enough rate, and was
lacking in overall efficiency. 96 Fortunately for General Electric, the United States
government aided General Electric during this difficult period. General Electric received
$21.5 million in post-war tax refund bonds, and an additional $127 million in contract
termination claims from the government.97 Although the defense orders received by
General Electric in 1945 were only half of the number received in 1944, the company
managed to conclude 1945 with earnings and surplus relatively equal to those of 1944. 98
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The conclusion of World War II had a substantial effect on General Electric
employees. Due to the cancellation of war contracts, there were fewer employment
opportunities in the company in the immediate post-WWII era. The result was a 14%
decrease in the number of General Electric employees at the end of 1945. 99 According to
General Electric’s 1945 annual reports, many female employees resigned from their
positions once WWII ended because they wished to return to their prewar occupations. 100
Returning war veterans ultimately filled many of the positions made available by these
women. 101
General Electric predicted that much of the technology it developed during World
War II could be applied to the creation of peacetime products. Cohen explains that
because the government favored a mass consumption-driven economy in the immediate
postwar era, companies like General Electric were able to “facilitate the transfer of
government-funded research from military to consumer applications.” 102 In this sense, a
spillover of military technology increased the company’s ability to create state-of-the-art
consumer products. For example, an advertisement from the 1945 edition of the
Monogram explains that air conditioning equipment has become “more compact, more
flexible, and more efficient” as a result of the company’s research during World War
II. 103 Specific products that General Electric planned to produce for consumer and
industrial use in the immediate post-war era were air conditioning, electric blankets, gas
turbines, wire recorders, televisions, plastics, automatic washing machines, dish washers,
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germicidal lamps, silicone rubber, aircraft instruments, fluorescent lamps, and industrial
electronic devices. 104
General Electric’s production problems continued in 1946 for two primary
reasons. First and foremost, inflation caused by the lifting of price controls at the
conclusion of World War II caused many General Electric employees to go on strike in
January. 105 The United Electrical Workers represented General Electric employees as
well as electrical workers from two of the company’s fiercest competitors, Westinghouse
and General Motors. 106 According to Kim Phillips-Fein, the author of Invisible Hands,
“The union was demanding a two-dollar-a-day raise for all workers, a goal that its leaders
had determined in industry-wide meetings would help to make up for the wage restraint
of the war years.” 107 General Electric failed to meet this demand, and hundreds of
thousands General Electric employees consequently went on a nine-week strike. 108
Although General Electric believed that it was paying its employees fair wages, the
company reluctantly gave in to the demands of the striking employees and increased
hourly wages by eighteen-and-a-half cents (an increase of $1.50 per day). 109
The second production problem faced by General Electric was its inability to meet
consumer and industrial demand. 110 Great innovation during the war years and in 1946
resulted in many new products being available to the public. For example, General
Electric now offered automatic washing machines and dishwashers to consumers, along
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with motors that powered mining and oil-drilling machinery. 111 As a result General
Electric’s production did expand in 1946, but consumer and industrial demand surpassed
General Electric’s supply of these goods.
Wage and salary increases for employees coupled with the company’s inability to
meet pent-up consumer demand had a detrimental effect on General Electric’s earnings
for the year. While wages increased 55.1% during the wartime period, the prices of
General Electric’s products only increased by 18%. 112 General Electric’s sales in 1946
were only half of its sales in 1945, causing a significant reduction in the company’s net
earnings, which were the lowest they had been since the Depression. 113
In 1947 General Electric was able to recover from its poor year of sales the
previous year. The company considered 1947 to be its “first representative post-WWII
year”, for by the end of the year it had been given a sufficient amount of time to
reconvert to the peacetime economy. Sales in 1947 were double those of 1946, and
income from these sales amounted to over $145 million and the earnings were also more
than double those of 1946. 114 These positive trends continued in 1948 and 1949. Sales
increased by $300 million from 1947 to 1948, and earning increased by $28 million. 115
Sales and earnings in 1949 were very similar to those of 1949. 116
General Electric’s annual reports during this period emphasizes the company’s
dedication to its employees and the American consumer as well as the heavy tax burden
placed on the company. The 1947 annual report states that, in an effort to prevent
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inflation, the prices of General Electric consumer products only increased half as much as
all manufactured products between 1940 and 1947. 117 This annual report also stressed the
importance of selling products that would improve American lives at an affordable price.
In addition, it pointed out that record highs were reached in 1947 for the number of
employees on the payroll as well as their average weekly earnings. 118 Finally. the 1947
annual report claims that a social responsibility of General Electric was, “to enable
management to learn how to become as successful in providing jobs which satisfy the
employees as the Company has been in supplying products which satisfy its
customers.” 119
General electric’s 1948 annual report maintains that earnings for that year could
have been substantially higher had government taxes not been significantly increased.
The annual report explains, “Federal, state, and local government agencies will collect, in
the form of all kinds of taxes for the year, a sum nearly one and one half times the
amount of the Company’s earnings.” 120 However, to put things in perspective, the taxes
imposed upon General Electric in 1948 were not nearly as high as the taxes imposed
during World War II. Continuing the theme of General electric’s dedication to the
American consumer, the 1948 annual report also claims that the company further
decreased the prices of its products in 1948 not only to save American consumers money,
but also because it wanted to set an example to other companies that increasing prices
would lead to inflation. 121
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Research for Government
Although World War II concluded in 1945, General Electric continued
production, research and development on behalf of the government in the immediate
post-war era. General Electric scientists had made significant contributions to the
production of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and both the
government and General Electric wanted the company to continue its exploration of
atomic energy for peacetime and military use. According to Brian Balogh, author of
Chain Reaction, the scientists who worked on the Manhattan Project were “The most
forceful advocates of the development of civilian nuclear power because they were the
very scientists who had been directly involved in its development and had placed it on the
agenda in the first place.” 122 Some of the scientists were no doubt employees of General
Electric.
The most important governmental project ultimately given to General Electric
during this period was the study of atomic energy. The dual purpose of atomic energy
research was to continue the production of nuclear weapons and also to find ways that
atomic energy could be used to generate power for practical purposes. Balogh explains
that the government was intrigued by the possibility of using atomic energy for civilian
purposes. 123 He observes, “A massive wartime effort inadvertently created a technology
that might prove to be of great social and economic value.” 124 In response to the
government’s call for research in atomic energy, General Electric’s 1946 annual report
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claims, “The entire scientific, engineering, and manufacturing facilities of the Company
will be drawn upon to further the atomic power project.” 125
In the summer of 1946, General Electric became responsible for Hanford
Engineer Works, which was a $350 million project based in Washington. 126 Hanford
Works was established in 1943 by decree of the government as part of the Manhattan
Project. Under the guidance of the United States Army Corps of Engineers, the primary
objective of Hanford Works was to produce plutonium that could be used in an atomic
bomb. At the conclusion of World War II, General Electric was entrusted by the
government to operate “an extensive program for atomic energy research and
development” at Hanford Works. The contract agreed to between General Electric and
the government was a cost-plus-$1-fee contract, meaning that General Electric would be
compensated for all expenses but not earn any direct profit. 127 Nonetheless, the company
stood to benefit significantly from the research conducted at Hanford Works by using this
research in furtherance of its effort to develop a nuclear power plant
Additionally, General Electric announced in November of 1946 that it had been
chosen to operate a $20 million government laboratory that would be built in order to
explore atomic energy. 128 Schenectady, New York was selected as the site for the
government laboratory, which was to be called the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory. 129
According to an article from the New York Times on November 10, 1946, the Knolls
Atomic Power Laboratory was the “fourth institution designed (by the government) to
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convert the power of the fissioned atom into uses beneficial for mankind.” 130 Although
not directly acknowledged in the 1946 annual report, Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory
was designed to explore atomic energy for defense purposes as well as for power
generation.
General Electric’s 1947 annual report hinted that the company was well on its
way to building a nuclear power plant that could generate electrical energy. Although
scientists and engineers still had many significant hurdles to overcome, General Electric
claimed, “the production of power from atomic energy power plants is possible within the
reasonably near future.” 131
Research and development in other areas also became increasingly important to
General Electric in 1947. The 1947 annual report states, “General Electric’s research
activities, which are the foundation for the Company’s products and services, are being
carried on more intensively than ever before.” 132 General Electric claimed that its most
influential laboratory was the General Engineering and Consulting Laboratory, located in
Schenectady, NY. General Electric had a long tradition of success in research and
development, and believed that it was fundamental to the growth of the company. The
intensified level of research and development by the company continued throughout the
remainder of the immediate postwar era, with much of it directed towards defense
purposes.
The General Engineering and Consulting Laboratory continued research on behalf
of the Army Ordnance Department in 1946 by performing research on guided missiles as
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well as rocket and jet engines. 133 Additional contracts signed in 1947 between General
Electric and the government provided funding for research on weather modification and
guided missile design for the benefit of the military. 134 Together with the atomic research
activities described above, these contracts provide evidence that close relations continued
to exist between General Electric, the government, and the military in the immediate
post-WWII era. Even during this time of peace, General Electric devoted significant
facilities and manpower to defense work.
General Electric made several major announcements in the field of atomic
research in 1948 and 1949. In March of 1948 General Electric created a Nucleonics
Department to operate the facilities at Hanford works, “where a tremendous physical
expansion is underway.” 135 The company’s 1949 annual report stated that the primary
objective of the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, which was nearing completion, would
be to design the first nuclear reactor power plant. 136 This laboratory was completed in
1950, General Electric was able to significantly boost its atomic research on behalf of the
government. The Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory immediately went to work helping the
Hanford Works produce plutonium. General Electric also revealed in its 1950 annual
report that General Electric research facilities had been creating “small amounts of
atomic energy since April, 1948.” 137
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Defense mobilization
The Korean War and Cold War rearmament necessitated an increase in defense
production that began in 1950. Following the conclusion of World War II, the United
States became increasingly wary of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union emerged as a
world superpower along with the United States in large part because Soviet scientists
were able to develop nuclear weapons. Daniel Kelves explains, “The Soviet Union was
perceived as threatening the West with armed aggression—a challenge that demanded not
only a major and immediate increase in military strength but, perhaps, an even larger
boost in defense research and development.” 138 In response to this perceived aggression,
the United States National Security Council proposed NSC-68 in April of 1950, which
recommended that the United States significantly increase its military peacetime
spending. 139 President Harry Truman used the invasion of South Korea by communist
North Korea as an impetus for adopting NSC-68. 140
Just as it had during World War II, the government called upon General Electric
to be a major contributor in defense mobilization for the Korean War. General Electric
claimed that it was natural for the United States government to call on the company for
defense production. The 1950 annual report explains, “The very nature of modern
military needs makes it inevitable that an organization with the skill, experience and
facilities that are brought together within General Electric will be heavily involved in the
nation’s defense program.” 141
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During the five-year period between the conclusion of World War II and the
beginning of the Korean War, 10% to 15% of General Electric’s business was in the
defense industry. 142 General Electric justified its continued role as a defense contractor in
the 1950 annual report, saying, “Because electric power and electrical products for
industry are so essential, General Electric, in a very real sense, is at all times engaged in
the business of producing for defense.” 143
As a result of Korean War contracts, the percentage of General Electric’s defense
work rose to 20% of its business, with 80% of its business remaining in non-defense
areas. 144 Thus, unlike World War II, General Electric continued its production of
peacetime industrial and consumer goods. This was possible because of the smaller scale
of the Korean War, which meant that General Electric did not have the same set of
wholesale restrictions on production as it did in World War II. General Electric asserted
that defense mobilization took precedence over the production of peacetime goods, yet
the continued production of peacetime goods was essential for the American population
and the growth of the company. 145 In this sense, General Electric needed to find a balance
between contributing to defense mobilization and producing peacetime goods.
Advertisements appearing in Life Magazine shed light on how General Electric
perceived its defense production during the Korean War. These advertisements reiterate
the idea that General Electric and the government worked hand in hand to provide
defense materials for the military. Furthermore, each advertisement explains how General
Electric’s advanced technology is supporting American troops fighting in Korea.
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Two defense areas in which General Electric specialized were in jet production
and military electronics. In an advertisement appearing in the November 1952 edition of
Life, General Electric explains that a company engine powers the Air Force’s new
“Sabre” jet plane. The advertisement concludes, “The flow of finished G-E jets to your
Air force is getting bigger every day. Thus, G-E engineering research helps keep
America’s air defense strong.” 146 An advertisement appearing in the April 1952 edition
of Life glorifies General Electric’s contribution to military electronics by intertwining the
company’s work in this field with its industrial electronics work. The advertisement
states, “G-E scientists are helping to make military and industrial electronics America’s
strongest weapons in war and peace. In these fields, as in television, radio, and all other
phases of electronics, you can look to General Electric for leadership.”147
Defense work appears to have been largely responsible for increases in General
Electric’s sales and net earnings in 1950. Although the company was able to make
improvements in commercial sales in 1950, the most drastic gains were made in its
defense sales. After increasing its defense production in 1950, General Electric earned
over $346 million in 1950 from “income from operations” in comparison to the $188
million it made in 1949. 148
The 1950 annual report predicted that General Electric would be devoting 35% of
its business to the defense industry in 1951. 149 Furthermore, General Electric was
prepared to convert a portion of its consumer and industrial manufacturing facilities to
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defense products. 150 However, the company’s defense business remained at 20% in 1951
and barely any manufacturing facilities underwent significant alterations for defense
production. 151
General Electric’s net earnings in 1951 were $35 million less than in 1950, and
according to the company, the United States government was largely responsible for this
drop in earnings. As a result of the Korean War, the government set limits on General
Electric’s prices, wages and salaries, and also drastically increased taxes. The 1951
annual report explains, “With federal taxes having taken 67 cents out of every dollar of
the Company’s pretax earnings last year, as against 53 cents in 1950, the remaining net
profit was 20 per cent less than was earned in the preceding year.” General Electric
acknowledged that the country was in the midst of a national emergency, yet it was
unhappy with how the government’s policies affected the company’s earnings. In the
1951 annual report, General Electric representatives went as far as to claim “the
remaining profit (after taxes in 1951) is inadequate to satisfy the actual requirements of
the business during this period of inflation.” 152
The sharp increase in defense production that had been predicted for 1951
occurred in 1952. General Electric’s total sales rose to $2.62 billion in 1952, and defense
production accounted for 30% of gross sales. General Electric admitted that its
accelerated defense production was one of the most important factors in increased sales.
The 1952 annual report highlights the benefits to General Electric from its involvement in
defense production: “Your company’s heavy engagement in defense work promises
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substantial future business both in the continuation of its present assignments and in
possible outgrowths from them.” Government taxes dropped slightly in 1952, and as a
result earnings increased for General Electric.153
The link between American government and General Electric in the form of
Charles E. Wilson no doubt impacted General Electric’s role in defense production, both
during World War II and in the post-war era. Wilson served as President of General
Electric from January 1, 1940 to September 18, 1942, but left his position in order to join
the War Production Board as executive-vice chairman. 154 Wilson regained his position as
President of General Electric during the final year of World War II, only to leave the
company in late 1950 to become the head of the Office of Defense Mobilization. 155 An
article appearing in Life Magazine from January 1951 describes the enormous power that
Wilson had while working as the head of the Office of Defense Mobilization. According
to Life Magazine, President Truman gave Wilson “the most sweeping authority ever
granted to a U.S. citizen other than the President himself.” 156 Wilson serves as a classic
case of the Military-Industrial Complex; he held high positions within the government
and General Electric, and clearly had the power to influence the government’s issuing of
defense contracts.
I believe that General Electric, the United States government, and its military each
benefited significantly from their relationship from World War II through 1952. General
Electric’s defense production played an important role in supplying the military during
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World War II and the Korean War. Further, the government benefited from the revenue it
accumulated through federal taxes placed on General Electric’s income.
In return, revenues from defense contracts caused General Electric to double in
size during World War II, and then helped the company transition to a peacetime
economy when the war ended. Between the conclusion of World War II and 1952,
General Electric had invested an astounding $650 million in plant modernization and
expansion; this could not have been accomplished without the aid of government
contracts. 157 Much of General Electric’s success as a company during World War II and
the post-war era between through 1952 should be attributed to defense production on
behalf of the United States government and military.
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III. General Electric And The Military-Industrial Complex (1953-1961)
The following chapter focuses on General Electric’s relationship with the United
States government and military between 1953 and 1961. Just as it did in the immediate
post-WWII era, General Electric continued to be heavily involved in work under
government contracts. The company explored uses of atomic energy for both civilian and
military purposes, and maintained a relatively high rate of defense production.
Furthermore, the government backed General Electric’s newly formed Space Systems
Division. General Electric, the government, and the military continued to greatly benefit
from working hand in hand with one another.
However, General Electric’s attitude towards defense production appears to have
changed between 1953 and 1961. Following the conclusion of the Korean War (July
1953), General Electric stated in company publications that it wished to turn its primary
focus to consumer and industrial production. Although defense sales may have been
slightly less profitable than consumer and industrial sales, I believe that defense work
continued to be vital to General Electric’s stability and growth. Between 1953 and 1961,
there appears to be a direct correlation between the company’s overall sales/earnings and
defense sales. Additionally, government contracts for atomic research allowed General
Electric to become the leader in this field and also strengthened national defense.
General Electric’s defense work from 1953 to 1961 was impacted to a significant
extent by President Eisenhower’s defense budget. Eisenhower was “instinctively cautious
about permitting a rapid expansion in defense spending,” and believed that reducing the
country’s defense spending would actually enhance America’s strength in competition
with the Soviet Union. Rather than increasing the defense budget, Eisenhower stressed
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the importance of modernization through scientific research. As a result, federal spending
on defense decreased as a percentage of the country’s GNP, and a larger portion of the
defense budget was spent on scientific research and development during Eisenhower’s
presidency. 158 Eisenhower’s revolutionary approach to defense spending came to be
known as the “New Look” strategy, which was described as “in simplest terms, an
explicitly nuclear defense.” 159
In accordance with the “New Look” strategy, General Electric directed much of
its atomic research to military applications. For example, the company sought to build
nuclear reactors for submarines, and explored the possibility of a nuclear powered jet.
However, General Electric also made significant gains in its research on atomic energy as
a source of electrical power during this period. The civilian aspect of General Electric’s
research on atomic power helped to lay the foundations for the company’s future
commercial business in nuclear power. In this sense, General Electric’s research on
atomic power during this era had large implications for the country’s defense and the
commercial business of nuclear power.
This chapter will be divided into two sections. The first section will follow
General Electric from 1953 to 1956 and the second will examine the company from 1957
to 1961. Each section will include three subsections: General Electric’s overall growth,
developments in atomic energy, and developments in national defense.
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Overall Growth (1953 to 1956)
At the outset of 1953, the United States was still actively fighting against
communist forces in the Korean War. As a result, General Electric continued its elevated
defense production on behalf of the United States government and military. Furthermore,
the company’s research and development on defense products helped the United States to
maintain its leadership in defense technology. Asked why General Electric was so
heavily engaged in defense production in March of 1953, Walter C. Heckman, General
Manager of the Aeronautic & Ordnance Systems Division, responded “Basically, because
we are a good, corporate citizen. I think that best describes General Electric’s attitude.
We’re dedicated to the job of helping America maintain its defense leadership.” 160 There
is no indication in Heckman’s comments that General Electric’s defense production is
benefiting the company. Instead, Heckman is implying that General Electric’s continued
involvement in the defense industry is solely based on public spiritedness.
The Korean War concluded in late July of 1953 with the signing of an armistice
that reestablished the border between North and South Korea. How would the end of the
Korean War affect General Electric, especially since over 30% of the company’s sales
had been to the defense department by the end of the war? John W. Belanger, vice
president of the Defense Products Group, did not see the Korean truce impacting defense
activities in the near future. 161 When asked in mid-August, Belanger asserted that
General Electric’s defense contributions needed to continue “because of the need to keep
our nation out in front of potential enemies.” 162 In this sense, Belanger was advocating
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for General Electric to be permanently engaged in defense work on behalf of the
government.
The year 1953 was widely successful for General Electric. Sales and earnings
both increased from 1952 to 1953 (19% and 9% respectively), as did sales in the Defense
Products Group (up 28% over 1952). 163 Had it not been for “excess profits” taxes
imposed by the government, these percentages would have been even higher. 164 The
1953 annual report admits that increases in the company’s sales and earnings must
partially be attributed to growth in defense sales. 165 However, the report states, “defense
business—which the Company always stands ready to undertake for our Government—is
less attractive from an earnings standpoint than our regular commercial business.” 166
This and other statements in the 1953 annual report reveal that General Electric
was looking to head in a new direction as it entered 1954. Sales of defense materials
dropped during the last quarter of 1953, and the annual report predicted that these sales
would continue declining to the point where defense production represented only 20% of
the company’s business. 167 Once the defense business declined, General Electric planned
to focus more of its attention on developing commercial products through research and
development in its commercial business. The 1953 report states, “Your management
believes that there has been no more important activity than research and development in
contributing to past growth and insuring the Company’s future progress.” 168
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General Electric’s desire to reduce its defense production and focus on developing
the commercial aspect of its business is consistent with President Eisenhower’s defense
spending. Following the conclusion of the Korean War in July of 1963, Eisenhower
immediately reduced the defense budget by $5 billion. 169 The President was an anticommunist Cold Warrior who believed in the importance of having a strong military.
However, Eisenhower was convinced that it was necessary to hold the line on the defense
budget because he believed that excessive defense spending was unhealthy for the
American economy. 170 Although Eisenhower was berated by the Democratic Party, press,
and military for cutting the government’s defense budget, he insisted that it was in the
best interest of the country. 171 General Electric’s defense work slowly declined with
Eisenhower’s decreasing defense budget from 1954-1956.
From an earnings perspective, 1954 was by far the most successful year in
company history. As expected, defense production slowly declined while research and
production in commercial fields increased. However, the primary reason for the
company’s record earnings was that the government did not impose federal excess profit
taxes in 1954, which saved General Electric at least $50 million dollars. 172 Earnings
remained stable in 1955 and 1956, and the company’s defense business leveled off to
approximately 20% of total sales. 173
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Atomic Energy Developments (1953-1956)
General Electric indicated in 1953 that it was on the verge of achieving its goal of
finding effective peacetime applications for atomic energy. Vice President of Engineering
H.A. Winne stated in March of 1953 that “we (GE) are just on the threshold of peacetime
uses of atomic energy with a long and difficult corridor stretching out ahead of us.” 174
Winne anticipated that a nuclear power plant could be built in the foreseeable future, but
noted that there were still significant problems to be solved. Winne admitted that atomic
energy would likely never replace oil or gas as fuel; instead, it would supplement these
conventional fuels. 175 Winne also said the most likely military application for atomic
energy that General Electric would focus on was the development of a power source for
submarines, noting that “the initial fuel charge would be sufficient to permit the
submarine to operate for a number of months without requiring additional fuel.” 176
Developments at Hanford Works in 1953 suggested that General Electric was
making considerable progress towards harnessing the power of atomic energy for
peacetime use. As explained in the previous chapter, the government constructed Hanford
Works as part of the Manhattan Project in 1943, and General Electric began operating the
plant during the summer of 1946 under the guidance of the government’s Atomic Energy
Commission. In July of 1953, it was announced that plutonium was being produced at the
plant “at a higher rate than ever before.” 177 The increase in plutonium production at
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Hanford Works was partially attributed to a $275 million plant expansion program
funded by the Atomic Energy Commission. 178
Additionally, General Electric President Ralph J. Cordiner proposed a plan in
October of 1953 to make Hanford Works the site of the first large-scale nuclear power
plant. 179 The Monogram explained that General Electric was able to make such a
proposal because of the significant technological progress that had been made at Hanford
Works. 180 Furthermore, the Monogram claimed that General Electric deserved the
responsibility of carrying out such an important operation because employees of the
company comprised “nearly one-sixth of 74,000 employees recently estimated by the
Atomic Energy Commission for all of its operations contractors, excluding government
employees and construction employees.” 181
Balough explains in Chain Reaction that much of the push for nuclear reactors
during this period came from the military. 182 Given that nuclear reactors were expensive,
complicated, and potentially dangerous, private corporations were hesitant to attempt to
produce them. 183 However, the military was outspokenly in favor of nuclear reactors
because they had the potential to power submarines and airplanes. 184 General Electric
appeared to recognize in 1953 that producing nuclear reactors and power plants could
ultimately become a profitable business for the company. W.E. Johnson, a general
manager at Hanford, predicted that atomic energy would eventually take its place among
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privately owned industries and that “the government will buy its plutonium for defense
purposes as a by-product of the atomic power business.” 185
In 1954, General Electric had a banner year in atomic research. Knolls Atomic
Power Laboratory in Schenectady and Hanford Works spearheaded the company’s
research in atomic energy for both defense and peacetime purposes. 186 Just like Hanford
Works, Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory was constructed and owned by the government,
but operated by General Electric. One of the primary objectives of this laboratory was to
develop an effective system of nuclear propulsion for submarines.
As for the priorities of General Electric’s Atomic Products division, the
Monogram claims that the division wanted “first to progress and provide weapons for
defense—new, better or cheaper—as required by the overall defense situation; second—
to see that the maximum of what we learn is put to ultimate peacetime use.” 187 Thus, the
company saw its atomic research in 1954 first and foremost as a defense investment.
According to the Monogram, it could not disclose many of the accomplishments at
Hanford Works and Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory for national security purposes. 188
The government also entrusted General Electric to be the lone private company to
conduct atomic research. In October of 1954, the Atomic Energy Commission
announced, “Among 70 organizations receiving new or renewed contracts for
unclassified research, General Electric would be the only industrial concern.” 189 The
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other contracts were given to research foundations and educational institutions. 190
General Electric’s selection as the sole company to explore the commercial uses of
atomic energy would be highly beneficial for the company in years to come.
General Electric made a major breakthrough in its defense work in 1955, when
the Atomic Products division successfully created a revolutionary atomic reactor capable
of powering submarines. The majority of the work on this atomic reactor was completed
at the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory in Schenectady. 191 The reactor was used in the
Seawolf, which was launched in Groton, Connecticut on July 21, 1955. 192 The Seawolf’s
atomic reactor was much more advanced than the reactor used in the Nautilus, which was
the first atomic submarine. 193 General Electric had not produced the reactor used in the
Nautilus which, as explained in the Monogram, was “a thermal type reactor which
produced steam for the turbine system while the Seawolf uses an intermediate reactor
which has a neutron speed considerably faster than the thermal type.” 194
General Electric became fully responsible for two of the most valuable atomic
research laboratories in the country when the government sold Knolls Atomic Laboratory
and Hanford Works to the company in May of 1956. 195 Further, although General
Electric now owned these two plants, the government would continue to pay the company
$2.65 million pear year to operate the plants. 196 Prior to this transaction, both of these
plants had been operated by General Electric under a “cost plus $1 fee contract,” and
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therefore the company was supposedly not making a direct profit from its work. 197 With
Hanford Works and Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory now under its full ownership and
with the company receiving an annual operating fee of $2.65 million, General Electric
was better positioned to profit from its research and development on atomic energy.
There is room for speculation as to whether General Electric accumulated profits
during its operation of Hanford Works under the “cost plus $1 fee contract.” In an
interview with several U.S. Senators, Vice President of Engineering H.A. Winne revealed
that General Electric received a monthly payment of $200,000 for its work at Hanford. 198
Winne dismissed allegations that this money was a profit for General Electric; he claimed
that the monthly payments were “an administrative fund against which we (General
Electric) make such charges as we can justify as actual expenditures.” Given this
statement, it appears that General Electric had some discretion in determining its costs of
operating Hanford Works. Stuart Brandes explains that defense contractors often times
had difficulty determining “reasonable cost” of its operations. 199 In fact, some defense
contractors were inclined to take advantage of the “cost plus contracts” by inflating
salaries in order to make a profit. 200
National Defense Developments (1953-1956)
General Electric made significant contributions to defense development during
the first half of 1953 in support of the United States military forces in the Korean War.
General Electric’s defense production covered the entire military spectrum; especially
important advancements were made in engines, turbines, and radar. The company’s space
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department also worked on developing ballistic missiles, which were considered essential
for the nation’s security. Although General electric’s defense sales began to decline after
the Korean War ended, the company’s continuing defense work pertaining to atomic
energy and air power was especially important during this period. President Eisenhower’s
“New Look” defense strategy stressed the importance of furthering the United States’
atomic and air power, and as one of the country’s leading defense contractors, it was
imperative that General Electric meet the President’s expectations. 201
Several advertisements appearing in Life Magazine between 1953 and 1956
highlight the close relationship between General Electric and the government in defense
production. An advertisement that details General Electric’s new technologies in
torpedoes explains, “cooperation between industry and our armed services helps assure
America of the best possible tools for defense…and the most protection for the
taxpayers’ defense dollars.” 202 Another advertisement appearing in the March 1953
edition of Life Magazine, General Electric calls for other companies to support the
national defense. The advertisement reads, “Defense is everybody’s business, and our
safety depends upon the successful cooperation of all companies, large and small, to meet
the vital, growing needs of our Armed Forces.” 203 By promoting its defense work in a
mainstream magazine such as Life, General Electric no doubt hoped that the American
public would admire the company for its dedication to national defense.
Still another advertisement appearing in the September 1954 edition of Life
Magazine explains that the bombers of the Air Force’s Strategic Air Command were
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equipped with General Electric jet engines. The advertisement states, “The top
performance of the six General Electric J47 jet engines, which power SAC’s Boeing B-47
bombers, and much other equipment of a classified nature, is the result of years of
teamwork between Air Force and G-E specialists.” 204 The Air Force’s Strategic Air
Command bombers were considered to be essential for the nation’s safety, for they had
the power to attack enemies with nuclear force. The advertisement concludes, “General
Electric is proud that it shares the Air Force’s grave responsibility: that of keeping peace
and keeping America free.” 205
General Electric also produced engines for other types of jet planes, and in May
of 1956 the company announced that a General Electric jet engine was responsible for
powering the world’s fastest combat fighter and commercial airliner. 206 The company’s
engine, known as the J79, helped to “assure U.S. leadership in the race for air supremacy
and security” according to J.S. Parker, General Manager of the Aircraft Gas Turbine
Division. 207 The B-58 Hustler, which was the first supersonic bomber ever to be
produced, was also powered by four General Electric J79 engines. 208
During this period, General Electric’s defense production team also made several
advances pertaining to radar. In 1954, the Heavy Military Electronic Equipment Division
strengthened the U.S. Air Force by equipping planes with the world’s most powerful
radar. 209 The Monogram provides a detailed explanation of the radar: “The search gear
finds the incoming high-flying intruder aircraft, while the new height-finder, with its
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powerful beam of energy, provides information on distance, altitude and flight direction
which is relayed to fighter-interceptor aircraft or antiaircraft weapons.” 210 With a new
and improved radar, American pilots had a significant combat advantage over enemy
planes.
General Electric also benefited the nation’s defense through its production of gas
turbines. The company was commissioned by the government to build a gas turbine for
the Navy’s Liberty Ship John Sergeant in January of 1956. 211 The Monogram explains,
“Five United States Lines engineers who will serve aboard the John Sergeant, are now
assigned to G.E.’s Gas Turbine Department in Schenectady where they are learning about
the turbine during manufacture and test operation.” 212 Once completed, the gas turbine
produced in Schenectady was expected to increase the ship’s speed by over 50%. 213
Finally, General Electric’s defense work during this period included rocket design
and construction. 1954 marked the tenth year that General Electric had been developing
guided missiles. 214 During this ten year period, General Electric “successfully launched a
large rocket in the hemisphere; designed, constructed and operated the first large rocket
static test facilities in the U.S.; and developed an engine with the highest specific impulse
ever achieved in rocket flight.” 215 General Electric formed a Special Defense Projects
group in 1955, which played an essential role in the development of missile technology.
According to the February, 1955 edition of The Monogram, the Special Defense Projects
were “specially staffed and organized to serve the national defense effort in the
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engineering and production of large, highly complex missile systems.” A General
Electric advertisement appearing in Life Magazine attributed the development of guided
missiles during this period to “Forward thinking by your Armed Forces, backed up by the
technical experiences of companies like General Electric.” 216
Overall Growth (1957 to 1961)
Between 1957 and 1961, General Electric continued to emphasize the company’s
important role in defense production and aerospace research for the United States
government and military. The annual reports and the Monogram focus on the defense and
aerospace industries to an even more significant degree during this period. General
Electric’s enhanced emphasis in defense and aerospace production is directly related to
the Soviet Union’s launching of Sputnik in October of 1957. General Electric began
publishing The Defense Quarterly in 1958, which was focused on communicating ideas
regarding national defense to leaders/executives in government, the military, and in major
defense companies. The Defense Quarterly was a blatant effort by the company to step up
its lobbying for defense contracts. Even so, General Electric continued to note in its
publications that the defense industry was not the most profitable source of business for
the company.
Paul Dickson’s Sputnik describes the Soviet Union’s launching of this satellite
and explains how its successful orbit of the earth helped to spur the United States’ space
research and development. Dickson explains that once Sputnik was launched “The space
race was under way, and the Soviets had won the first leg—the United States was agog
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and unnerved.” 217 The United States government did not want the country to be viewed
as weak or complacent, so it immediately set out to gain ground on the Soviet Union in
the space race. 218 The government consequently invested an unprecedented amount of
money in the country’s space work, and as a result, American science, technology, and
engineering companies became more involved in space research and development. 219
In large part due to the successful launch of Sputnik, President Eisenhower was
under great pressure to increase defense spending during his second term in office. The
National Security Council issued the Gaither Report in November of 1957, which called
for the Eisenhower Administration to greatly increase defense spending. 220 Furthermore,
both Democrats and Republicans in Congress attempted to coerce Eisenhower to expand
the defense budget during his second term. 221 Even so, Eisenhower maintained his
position on minimizing defense expenditures, and did not allow the defense budget to
grow substantially.
General Electric President Ralph J. Cordiner made it explicitly clear in the
“President’s Comments” section of the 1957 annual report that the company would be
devoting more of its focus to defense work. Cordiner cited competition with communist
nations as the primary reason why General Electric needed to play a larger role in defense
production. 222 Cordiner stated that General Electric would contribute to the defense effort
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by working in areas of atomic energy, electronics, flight propulsion, and missile
technology. 223
Although not directly stated by Cordiner, one can infer that Sputnik inspired this
renewed dedication to defense work. Cordiner argued that the contributions made by
General Electric “take on an added significance in a period of history when the American
economy is challenged to stay out ahead of the aggressive Communist drive for technical,
military, and economic leadership.” 224 Cordiner’s emphasis on defense production was
consistent with the defense budget adopted by the government for 1957. Sputnik and the
Gaither Report essentially pushed Eisenhower’s hand to increase the defense budget. by
over $2 billion the prior year. 225
General Electric’s defense sales did not substantially increase between 1956 and
1957, but the company began to devote more of its manpower to its defense work. The
1957 annual report explains, “The grave importance which General Electric attaches to
its work for national security is indicated by the fact that during 1957 nearly half of the
Company’s scientists, engineers and technicians were on defense assignments
representing only about 20 percent of the company’s activity.” 226 How could General
Electric possibly afford to devote half of its scientists, engineers, and technicians to its
“least profitable” industry? Although the company had contended in previous years that
earnings were lower in the defense industry, it saw a $245 million increase in sales and a
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$34 million gain in earnings in 1957 with an increased emphasis on defense
production. 227
Due to a slow economy during the first part of the year, General Electric’s sales of
consumer goods dropped in 1950. 228 Fortunately for the company, sales of defense
products to the government compensated for the drop in consumer sales. President
Cordiner explains in the 1958 annual report that “Substantial backlogs of unfilled orders
for apparatus and defense equipment assured a high level of production in these lines
early in the year, when sales of consumer goods and components declined markedly.” 229
While many other companies surely suffered from the declining economy, General
Electric had its defense business to soften the blow.
General Electric’s sales ultimately dropped by approximately $215 million in
1958, while earnings fell by only $5 million. 230 One can be assured that these results
would have been substantially worse had it not been for General Electric’s defense sales,
which increased to 24% of the company’s total sales for the year. 231 The 1958 annual
report explains, “Federal government expenditures for national defense continued at high
levels throughout 1958, and showed increasing trends toward use of electrical, electronic,
and nuclear products and systems.” 232 Just as he did in the 1957 annual report, President
Cordiner reiterated the importance of General Electric’s defense business in order to
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“help the United States respond vigorously to the Soviet bid for world leadership.” 233
Even so, the company was reluctant to admit that defense sales truly benefited its growth.
The 1958 annual report states that General Electric agreed to additional contracts with the
government even though the earnings-sales ratios were lower in defense production in
comparison to commercial production. 234
1958 marked the inaugural year of General Electric’s The Defense Quarterly. This
publication was described by General Electric as being “a completely new company
magazine designed to communicate significant ideas on defense to those national leaders
and customers affecting General Electric’s defense business.” The authors of The Defense
Quarterly were members of the electronic, atomic, and defense systems groups, and the
magazine was published four times a year. The primary purpose of The Defense
Quarterly was to justify and promote General Electric’s significant role in defense
production. In this sense, The Defense Quarterly was a part of General Electric’s
lobbying effort to secure its place within the Military-Industrial Complex. Publication of
The Defense Quarterly continued all the way through the 1960s (the name of the
publication changed to The General Electric Forum in 1967). In essence, The Defense
Quarterly claimed that a tight-knit relationship between the government, military, and
General Electric was necessary for the safety of the country. 235
General Electric bounced back from a down year in 1958 to reach all time highs
in sales and earnings in 1959. Especially impressive its $280 million in earnings, which
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was by far the most in company history. 236 Just as sales and earnings increased, so did the
scope of General Electric’s defense work. Defense sales accounted for 25% of the
company’s total business, the highest percentage since the conclusion of the Korean
War. 237 The 1959 annual report claims, “the volume of the Company’s defense work
depends basically on the level of national defense expenditures.” However, it was not an
increase in defense spending that caused General Electric’s boost in defense production
in 1959; the country’s defense spending dropped by nearly $1 million from 1958 to
1959. 238 Instead, Eisenhower’s emphasis on atomic and air power in the defense budget
provided General Electric with additional research and development opportunities.
From an earnings standpoint, 1960 was a disappointing year for General Electric.
Although the company’s sales reached $4.2 billion, its earnings dropped to $200 million,
the lowest amount earned by the company since 1954. 239 General Electric cited
increasing foreign competition as the primary reason for this decline in earnings, for it
forced the company to reduce price levels.240 Defense sales also fell in 1960, dropping
from 25% (in 1959) to 22% of the company’s total sales.241 The 1960 annual report
attributed the decline in defense sales to the government’s decision to decrease overall
military procurement. 242
The 1960 annual report again warned the company’s shareowners that “in defense
work generally the earnings as a per cent of sales are well below those for commercial
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business.” 243 In fact, General Electric went as far as to claim that being involved in the
defense industry was increasingly risky for the company because it had to continuously
make “development expenditures and investments in new facilities preparatory to
securing many defense contracts.” 244 Although defense work had been a critical factor in
funding the company’s growth the past 20 years, General Electric expressed concern over
being vulnerable to the ebb and flow of defense production in 1960.
John F. Kennedy’s election to the Presidency in November of 1960 had
significant implications for the country’s defense budget. When Kennedy assumed his
position of office in January of 1961, he immediately sought out to reduce the rate at
which America was producing nuclear weapons. Kennedy was optimistic that increasing
the defense budget and reprioritizing defense spending would help to “liberate American
strategy from its predominant reliance on nuclear weapons.” 245 Kennedy proposed to
reduce government spending on atomic energy research, and increase the country’s focus
on catching the Soviet Union in the space race.
General Electric was able to recover from its disappointing year in 1960 and
increase both sales and earnings in 1961. Sales reached a record high of over $4.5 billion,
while earnings returned to a more normal figure of $242 million. 246 Defense sales
increased to 25% of total sales, which was consistent with President Kennedy’s addition
of over $2 million to the country’s defense budget. 247 However, the 1961 annual report
states that this increase in defense sales actually limited the earnings of the company: “the
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higher proportion of defense work in 1961 was a factor tending to limit the year’s
improvement in the ratio of earnings to sales.” 248 Again, General Electric attempted to
minimize the benefits it derived form its defense work.
Ironically, the 1961 annual report also revealed that General Electric performed
$1.5 billion worth of research and development on behalf of the government during the
1950s, more than any other company. 249 The annual report acknowledged that such
extensive research and development “opened up new markets, brought out new and
improved products, and strengthened national security.” 250 In this sense, defense
production not only provided an important source of the company’s revenue from the
government, but also allowed the company to expand its scope of production and
improve the quality of its commercial products. In my view, the argument that defense
production impaired General Electric’s ability to earn greater profits is not just
misleading; it is downright false.
Atomic Energy Developments (1957-1961)
From 1957 to 1961, General Electric made tremendous gains in the
commercial/peacetime application of atomic energy. First and foremost, in October of
1957, General Electric began operation of the world’s first privately owned and operated
atomic electric power plant. 251 Located in Pleasanton, California, the Vallecitos Atomic
Laboratory “provided power for homes, farms, and industries in 47 California
counties.” 252 However, General Electric had been reluctant to build the Vallecitos Atomic
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Laboratory. In early 1952, General Electric backed out of its agreement to build the plant
and agreed to complete the project only after Lewis L. Strauss, chief of the Atomic
Energy Commission, offered the company $25 million in “costed operations.” 253
General Electric also opened the Dresden power plant in 1960, which was the first
privately financed nuclear power plant in the United States. 254 Valued at $40 million,
Dresden was built by General Electric for Commonwealth Edison. 255 Dresden reached
full power operation for the first time in July of 1960, and according to the Monogram,
Dresden’s electrical output was “greater than that of any other operating atomic power
station in the world designed solely for power production.” 256 With the help of plants
such as Vallecitos and Dresden, by 1960 General Electric had “built an international
business in atomic plants, research and test reactors, supply of nuclear fuels, and controls
and instrumentation systems.” 257
Although General Electric focused much of its attention on the commercial
nuclear business between 1957 and 1961, the company also managed to continue defense
research on nuclear propulsion for navy vessels. A new million-dollar addition was made
to the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory in January of 1957 for the study of nuclear
reactors. 258 This was followed by an announcement in March that Knolls had been “given
the task of developing a nuclear power plant for a Navy destroyer” by the Atomic Energy
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Commission. 259 The government contributed an additional $35 million to the laboratory
in June of 1958 in order to further research and development there. 260
The Triton, a nuclear submarine powered by two atomic reactors created at Knolls
Atomic Power Laboratory, launched in August of 1958. 261 The Seawolf also logged a
successful 60-day voyage in October of 1958, “smashing all records for uninterrupted
submergence independent of the earth’s atmosphere.” 262 With General Electric nuclear
reactors powering the Seawolf and the Triton, the United States would be able to more
effectively conduct covert submarine missions. Finally, in September of 1959 Knolls
Atomic Power Laboratory was granted $18.5 million by the Atomic Energy Commission
to build “natural circulation” reactors in order to create more reliable nuclear-powered
ships. 263
National Defense Developments (1957-1961)
Because of Eisenhower’s “New Look” strategy, which emphasized supremacy in
atomic weapons and delivery systems, and also in response to the launching of Sputnik,
General Electric’s primary focus in defense production shifted to research in the field of
missiles and space between 1957 and 1961. In late June of 1957 the government awarded
General Electric a $158 million contract to lead studies on long-range ballistic
missiles. 264 The largest defense contract awarded to General Electric since World War II
required the company to design nose cones for the Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile
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and the Thor intermediate range ballistic missile. 265 The study and development of these
missiles was considered to be “the nation’s highest priority defense program” in 1957. 266
This contract followed an $83 million contract signed by General Electric in April to
work on the guidance system for the Atlas missile. 267 The Air Force awarded General
Electric an additional $101 million contract for the development of nose cones in
November of 1959. 268
General Electric also announced in November of 1959 its plans for the
construction of a $14 million space facility in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania. 269 The
Monogram explains, “It will be one of the nation’s largest privately financed space
facilities, an example of private industry’s effort to help the U.S. attain space
leadership.” 270 General Electric was hopeful that the construction of the Valley Forge
space center, which it planned to complete by early 1962, would not only contribute to
the government space program, but also would allow the company to become a leader in
space developments. 271
The highlight of General Electric’s work for the space program in 1960 was its
recovery of the Discoverer satellite, which was “the first known recovery of a man-made
object that survived re-entry into the earth’s atmosphere.” 272 In 1961, General Electric
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was one of three companies selected by NASA to conduct studies for Project Apollo,
which was the United States’ attempt to land a man on the moon. 273
General Electric was also selected by the Air Force to build the world’s largest
radar system in March of 1958. 274 Called the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System, the
company’s Heavy Military Electronic Equipment Department was given the
responsibility of “designing, developing, producing, testing, and placing in operation the
super radar system.” 275 The Heavy Military Electronic Equipment Department ultimately
designed the FPS-7, which was capable of “detecting aircraft at higher altitudes and
longer distances and supplying target data faster than present systems.” 276 Such radar was
designed to help protect the United States from a nuclear attack. General Electric also
played an essential role in producing electronic control systems for planes used by the Air
Force. The Air Weapons Control System 212L, which began development in May of
1959, was described as the “U.S. Air Force’s answer to the vast problem of air defense
outside of the Continental United States.” 277
General Electric’s 1960 annual report explains that the company’s work on
electronic equipment focuses on “many types of radar, guidance and fire control systems
for missiles, nose-cone re-entry vehicles, sonar equipment for submarine detection and
automatic flight equipment.” 278 From this statement, it is clear that the company’s
defense work was guided by Eisenhower’s emphasis on missiles and air power.
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General Electric, the government and the military continued to benefit from
working cooperatively between 1953-1961. The Korean War as well as Cold War
rearmament required that the country maintain a relatively high level of defense
production. Just as it did during World War II, the government called upon General
Electric to be a leading supplier of defense products and to continue defense related
research and development. In part through contributions of General Electric and other
defense contractors, the government was able to guarantee the nation’s security by
fielding a well equipped and technologically advanced military.
Business with the government through defense contracts continued to provide
General Electric with a steady source of income. Furthermore, defense production lead to
opportunities for the company in atomic energy, space research, and jet engine
production, all of which would become increasingly profitable industries during the
1960s. During this period, there was a strong correlation between the growth of General
Electric (in terms of sales and earnings) and the percentage of the company’s defense
sales. However, the company downplayed the importance of the defense industry to its
well-being. General Electric acknowledged that the research, development, and
production it performed for the government and military was necessary for national
defense, but claimed that the defense industry was less profitable than commercial
business. 279
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IV. General Electric And The Military-Industrial Complex (1962-1970)
The following chapter focuses on General Electric’s role within the Military
Industrial Complex between 1962 and 1970. Increasing Cold War tensions as well as the
United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War tightened the relationship between the
government, the military, and General Electric. General Electric competed with other
companies for government contracts in a variety of fields pertaining to national defense.
The government drew upon General Electric’s technical capabilities to ensure the
country’s national security, and just as in past years, the work General Electric performed
for the government greatly benefited the sales and scope of the company.
The three primary areas in which General Electric worked under government
contracts were in atomic/nuclear research, space research, and defense production. The
research and development performed by General Electric on behalf of the government
paid huge dividends for the company between 1962 and 1970 by creating new
commercial opportunities. General Electric became a leader in the nuclear power
business as well as the top provider of jet engines for commercial airlines. Furthermore,
General Electric was a principal supplier of aerospace products for the government.
Because of its leading role in these industries, General Electric was able to effectively
expand its business to the international level. Thus, General Electric capitalized on
government funding it received in these three areas to create successful commercial
businesses. Furthermore, the company continued its direct defense work by producing
defense materials for the military. Even so, General Electric persisted in downplaying the
importance of the defense industry to the growth of the company.
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The United States’ defense budget varied between 1962 and 1970. While
President Kennedy was in office (1961-November of 1963), defense spending steadily
increased. However, when President Lyndon Johnson came to power after Kennedy’s
assassination, he immediately cut back on defense spending. President Johnson felt that a
build up of military forces in Vietnam was necessary in preparation for a potential war.
However, he did not believe that increased defense spending was necessary for this build
up. Rather than increasing the overall defense budget, Johnson spent a larger portion of
the budget on the military resources needed by the American military in Vietnam in 1964
and 1965. It was not until 1966 that Johnson chose to drastically increase the defense
budget. 280
This chapter will be divided into four sections. The first section will track the
growth and outlook of General Electric between 1962 and 1970 by focusing on the
company’s annual reports. The second section will describe the contributions made by
General Electric’s to the space industry. The third section will explain the company’s
involvement in atomic and nuclear research. The final section will describe General
Electric’s defense production, particularly the production of jet engines for the military,
and its relationship to the company’s growing business in commercial aviation.
Overall Growth
Between 1962 and 1970, General Electric experienced dramatic growth. Over the
course of eight years, sales improved at a relatively steady pace; sales in 1970 were $3.75
billion higher than sales in 1962. 281 Earnings, on the other hand, fluctuated on a yearly
basis, and did not appear to follow a particular trend. Earnings in some years were
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especially high ($361 million in 1967), while earnings in other years were disappointing
($219 million in 1964). 282 The percentage of sales on defense products also varied during
this period, but remained between the range of 17%-24% of the company’s total sales.
The company’s work in aerospace production was mainly for the government and was
considered essential for the nation’s security. Therefore, General Electric included its
aerospace sales within the company’s defense production.
General Electric had a successful year in 1962 in terms of overall sales and
earnings. Sales increased by 8% and earnings were 10% more than those from 1961. 283
Sales by the defense products departments accounted for nearly a quarter (24%) of the
company’s total sales. 284
The growth of its space business was an especially important achievement by
General Electric during 1962. President Cordiner explained in the 1962 annual report that
the space business, “starting in 1955 with 300 people and a single contract, had grown by
the end of 1962 to Division status, employing 13,000 people in a wide variety of
aerospace projects.” 285 The 1962 annual report also highlights work being done by
General Electric under government contract on missiles and electronics. In order to make
sure that the company’s aerospace and defense divisions were working hand in hand,
General Electric formed the Defense Programs Operation in 1962, which had the
responsibility of “serving the government’s aerospace and defense needs on a unified
basis.” 286 Finally, the report explains that the military’s limited but increasing
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involvement in Vietnam caused General Electric to place “added emphasis on the
development of faster and more powerful helicopters.” 287
Just as they did in 1962, sales and earnings increased for General Electric in 1963.
On the other hand, defense production slightly decreased in 1963, amounting to 22% of
the company’s total sales. 288 The 1963 annual report states that it was not the company’s
choice to decrease its defense output; instead, several of the programs being worked on
by the company were cancelled. 289 Given President Kennedy’s desire to reduce
production of nuclear weapons production, one might assume that research and
development contracts related to atomic energy were cancelled. Increases in orders for
military jet engines helped to minimize the losses from these cancelled programs. 290
Although defense sales dropped in 1963, the 1963 annual report states, “General
Electric people continued to have major responsibilities during 1963 in forwarding the
nation’s defense effort and its program of space exploration.” 291 Clearly, General Electric
did not shy away from taking credit for the contributions it was making to national
defense. However, the 1963 annual report continued the theme from prior annual reports
that defense work was not the most profitable business for the company: “there is a
growing disparity between profits on commercial work and on defense projects.” 292
In 1964, General Electric achieved new highs in sales, but earnings were
adversely affected by an event unrelated to its defense work. 293 An antitrust case brought
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by the government in 1960 against General Electric and others was settled in 1964, which
had significant repercussions for the company’s earnings. Along with 29 other electrical
companies, General Electric was convicted of price fixing and bid rigging, and
consequently had to repay the customers it had overcharged. 294 Once losses from the
antitrust case were taken into account, the company’s earnings dropped severely. 295
General Electric’s defense production also dropped from 22% of total sales in
1963 to 17% of total sales in 1964. 296 In a similar fashion to 1963, it was not the
company’s desire to decrease defense production; the 1964 annual report explains that the
government’s decision to cut back on defense expenditures made “1964 a year of
decreased sales for many defense contractors,” not just General Electric. 297 As previously
explained, the cut in the 1964 defense budget occurred because of President Johnson’s
priorities when he came into office. Even so, General Electric continued to champion its
important role in defense production. The annual report states, “The tremendous range of
the Company’s contributions to the nation’s security and space exploration programs, and
its capabilities for handling highly complex systems, are expected to maintain General
Electric’s annual aerospace and defense business at about the billion-dollar level.” 298
After a disappointing year in 1964 caused by the settlement of the antitrust case,
General Electric bounced back to have a much more successful year in 1965. Sales and
earnings in 1965 increased by 14% and 21% respectively over the previous year. 299 The
annual report characterized 1965 as a “turnaround year” for the company in terms of its
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aerospace and defense work. 300 In 1965, the United States greatly expanded its military
forces, and therefore needed defense contractors to provide increased amounts of defense
materials. Although defense sales remained at 17% of the company’s total sales, General
Electric significantly aided the United States military through its defense production. The
annual report explains, “In response to the U.S government’s call for advanced
equipment to strengthen the nation’s defenses and to help meet commitments in Vietnam,
the Company increased production of jet engines and flight control and armament
systems for planes and helicopters.” 301 The company also continued to develop its
nuclear business and made progress on Project Apollo with NASA.
General Electric increased sales by close to $1 billion in 1966, but earnings fell
from those of the prior year. 302 Building off of the “turnaround year” in 1965, aerospace
and defense sales rose 22% over 1965 levels, in part due to the expanding needs of the
United States military forces in Vietnam. 303 The 1966 annual report claims, “The
Company is maintaining the bulk of its aerospace and defense activity in longer-term
projects for national security, U.S. space programs and commercial uses of jet
engines.” 304 Additionally, General Electric continued to improve its position in the
nuclear industry. Speaking of its nuclear business, the annual report states, “The
Company’s leadership in this new industry was clearly established in 1966.” 305
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Sales and earnings increased for General Electric in 1967, primarily because of
the company’s success in new industries. The 1967 annual report claims, “The Company
has underway the greatest array of major new growth ventures in its history.” 306 Two of
the four “new growth ventures” listed were nuclear energy and advanced commercial
aircraft engines. 307 Thus, General Electric’s commercial applications of nuclear energy
and jet engines were reaping great rewards for the company.
Furthermore, General Electric raised its defense sales in 1967, as they accounted
for 20% of the company’s total sales. 308 The annual report attributes this increase in
defense sales to the military’s need for materials in Vietnam. However, the company
asserts that “by far the largest portion of this business remains based in long-term defense
and aerospace programs.” 309 Although General Electric acknowledged in the annual
report that aerospace and defense operations helped to improve the company’s earnings
in 1967, it once again maintains that profit levels in the defense industry are lower than
those for its commercial business.310
Sales continued to improve for General Electric in 1968, but the company’s
earnings dropped from the previous year. 311 Just as they had in 1967, General Electric’s
defense sales represented 20% of the company’s total sales in 1968. 312 General Electric
continued to maintain its stance in the 1968 annual report that the company’s defense
production was primarily in long-term projects for the military.
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Although 1968 was not a great success from a financial standpoint, General
Electric solidified itself as a leader in the nuclear, space, and commercial airline business.
According to the 1968 annual report, the company’s work on jet engines allowed it to
“establish a new foothold in the business of supplying jet engines for commercial
aircraft.” 313 The annual report also emphasized the important role the company had
within the nuclear business, saying, “General Electric has led in building not just a
business but an industry. With 44 nuclear plants completed or on order at the end of
1968, and with production scheduled well into the 1970’s, our reactor systems operations
alone have grown into a substantial business.”314 Finally, the annual report asserts that
the important role played by General Electric in the success of the Apollo 8 flight
established the company as “one of the major U.S. space companies.” 315
In terms of sales and earnings, 1969 was not an impressive year of growth for
General Electric. Sales improved minimally, while earnings declined drastically because
of a three month long strike towards the end of the year. 316 General Electric’s defense
production slightly declined in 1969; it accounted for 19% of the company’s total
sales. 317 The 1969 annual report attributes this decline to delayed shipments caused by
the fourth quarter strike and a substantial reduction in federal defense spending. 318
No doubt the biggest achievement for General Electric in 1969 was the role it
played in helping NASA land the first man on the moon. The annual report describes the
extent of the company’s involvement in Apollo 11’s historic flight, saying, “All in all, no
313
314
315
316
317
318

“Comments On 1968 Results And The Outlook,” 1968 Annual Report And Yearbook, p. 2.
Ibid, p. 1.
Ibid, p. 2.
“Chairman’s Comments,” 1969 Annual Report And Yearbook, p. 3.
“Review of 1969 Operations,” 1969 Annual Report And Yearbook, p. 17.
Ibid, p. 17.

80
less than 37 General Electric operations, directly involving more than 6,000 employees,
contributed to the vast industrial team effort that supported man’s first moon step.” 319
Finally, the annual report emphasizes the importance of commercial aviation to the
company’s future growth. 320
General Electric’s defense sales in 1970 were nearly identical to its in 1970 sales,
while the company’s earnings increased by $11 million. 321 According to the 1970 annual
report, technologies stemming from General Electric’s space operations were helping to
solve the United States’ urban and environmental problems. 322 The annual report states,
“GE aerospace technology was being applied in projects for the Departments of Health,
Education and Welfare, Housing and Urban Development, and Interior, as well as for the
Environmental Protection Agency and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration.” 323 Surprisingly enough, General Electric’s aerospace technologies had
civilian applications that benefited American citizens. As for the company’s nuclear
business, by the conclusion of 1970, General Electric had equipped 54 active nuclear
plants across the globe. 324
Space Business
General Electric made a substantial contribution to the success of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) between 1962 and 1970. NASA was
established in 1958 in response to the Soviet Union’s launching of Sputnik with the aim
of furthering the United States’ progress in space technology. The significant feats
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accomplished by NASA between 1962 and 1970 could not have been achieved without
the important role played by General Electric. The primary ways in which the company
aided space travel were by testing Saturn rockets, developing a radio guidance system,
and supplying fuel cells for electrical power.
General Electric was selected in 1962 to play a significant role in Project Apollo,
which was NASA’s plan to land a man on the moon by 1970. The 1963 annual report
explains the ways in which General Electric was expected to aid Project Apollo: “General
Electric will perform a vital role in assisting the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration in the performance of reliability assessment, check-out and integration
support for the Apollo system.” 325 In an attempt to make sure that General Electric did
not unfairly profit from its work in Project Apollo, the company’s contract with NASA
stipulated, “General Electric is barred from serving as a contractor or supplier in certain
other areas where its privileged relationship to the Apollo program gives it a special
advantage.” 326 General Electric was also given the responsibility of operating NASA’s
Mississippi Test Facility, which was valued at over $270 million. 327 The Monogram
explains, “On this 13,500-acre site NASA will test the towering Saturn rocket boosters
that will propel manned Apollo spacecraft to the moon.” 328 General Electric ultimately
directed over 6,000 of its employees to work on Project Apollo, 1,200 of whom were
stationed at the Mississippi Test Facility. 329
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An especially exciting event for General Electric occurred in September of 1962
when Elliot See was named as a member of the nine-man astronaut team for Project
Gemini. 330 A General Electric employee for over twelve years, See worked as a test pilot
prior to being selected by NASA for Project Gemini. 331 The primary objective of Gemini
was to complete “an outer-space rendezvous of manned spacecraft early in 1964.” 332 The
first Gemini spacecraft ultimately was sent into orbit with the help of General Electric’s
radio guidance team in March of 1965. 333 Fuel cells developed by General Electric
helped to power a subsequent Gemini mission August of 1965. 334
General Electric’s role in the space industry had a significant impact on American
satellite technology. Nimbus, a weather satellite designed and built by General Electric
under NASA’s guidance, was successfully launched in August of 1964. 335 The
Monogram explains that while in orbit, the Nimbus “gave meteorologists a more
complete and sophisticated look at the earth’s weather than was ever possible before.” 336
In June of 1967, Vice President Hubert Humphrey stressed the importance of the Nimbus
weather satellite, declaring that predicting and understanding weather would have the
overall effect of improving human life. 337 According to the Monogram, Vice President
Humphrey believed that the Nimbus satellite was “a great benefit to mankind and that the
dividends of the entire space program are found in this one object.” 338
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General Electric was also involved in space projects for the government that were
clearly military oriented. In August of 1965, the company was selected by the
government to “plan and develop the space experiments” for the Manned Orbiting
Laboratory. 339 The Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) was a $1.5 billion government
space program with the mission of launching a spacecraft into the earth’s atmosphere that
would remain in orbit for up to 30 days. 340 According to the Monogram, the purpose of
the MOL program was to “learn more about what man is able to do in space and how that
ability can be used for military purposes, develop technology and equipment which will
help advance manned and unmanned space flight, and experiment with this technology
and equipment.” 341 As evidenced by the MOL program, work done by General Electric
for the government in the space industry was another arena in which General Electric
profited from its role in the military industrial complex.
General Electric acknowledged that it was seeking to profit from its work in the
space business. The January, 1963 edition of the Monogram frankly states that “Space is
a big and profitable business now.” 342 The company attempted to increase interest in its
space business with foreign customers in April of 1965, inviting European industrialists
from 72 different companies to convene in Philadelphia for a discussion of the growing
space industry. 343 J.S. Parker, an executive in the company’s Aerospace and Defense
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Group, asserted to this group, “We have, in a sense, a world-wide common market in
space and we should both work now to develop and expand it.” 344
The work performed by General Electric on the Apollo project as well as other
government-funded programs elevated the company’s status in the space industry. In the
September 1969 edition of the Monogram, General Electric’s G. T. Smiley, who was the
general manager of Apollo Systems, explained how the company expected to benefit
from its involvement in Project Apollo. 345 Smiley predicted that General Electric would
gain longer range business opportunities from its work on Project Apollo, and would also
be able to transfer technologies from the project to other businesses outside of the
Aerospace Group. 346 An editorial from the Monogram highlights the importance of the
space industry to the growth of the company: “Progress in the air and space is offering
General Electric tremendous opportunities to demonstrate its competence and leadership.
Many of the new technologies unfolding will make man’s life better on the ground as in
the air. And that’s what General Electric traditionally emphasizes.” 347
Atomic and Nuclear Business
General Electric began 1962 with a new outlook regarding its research on atomic
power. Members of the company’s Atomic Power Equipment Department were hopeful
that their research on atomic power would become a profitable business for the company
in the immediate future. The June 1962 edition of the Monogram explains that General
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Electric was “Departing significantly from previous sessions, placing emphasis clearly on
the business aspects of atomics, rather than on the atomics aspects of business.” 348
General Electric announced in January of 1964 that the company would no longer
be operating Hanford Works for the Atomic Energy Commission. 349 Hanford Atomic
Products Manager Wilfrid E. Johnson explained that although the move might take the
public and employees by surprise, it “will enable the Company to best serve the
expanding needs of the nation’s atomic energy industry while fulfilling its responsibilities
to the AEC, Hanford employees, and the area communities.” 350 While under the care of
General Electric, Hanford grew its value by nearly $1 billion. 351 The Monogram states
that General Electric was promoting the growth of the atomic energy industry by handing
over the responsibility for Hanford to other companies and consequently getting them
involved in the atomic energy field. 352 In order to guarantee commercial diversification in
Richland (the town in Washington that Hanford is based), General Electric and the AEC
wanted several companies to take over Hanford rather than a single company. 353
Although General Electric claimed that it was helping the growth of the atomic
industry by relinquishing its responsibility at Hanford Works, it appears that the true
reason for this decision was that the company wanted to focus on expanding its nuclear
power business. Balogh explains that during the period from 1964 to 1968 a “Great
Bandwagon” market emerged for nuclear power plants. 354
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By March of 1964, General Electric was advertising nuclear power as a
reasonable alternative to fossil fuels for creating energy. 355 George Stathakis, Marketing
Manager of the company’s Atomic Power Equipment Department claimed, “Nuclear
power is not only competitive with fossil fuels in generating electricity but really quite
conventional.” 356 Atomic power generating stations officially became a General Electric
product in October of 1964 when the construction of such facilities was featured in the
company’s product handbook. 357 Potential customers now had the option of ordering
nuclear reactors or entire power plants from General Electric.358
Progress in the nuclear field allowed General Electric to market nuclear power
plants both domestically and to customers outside of the United States. Thanks in part to
government funding, General Electric had become one of the leaders in nuclear
technology, and the company now wished to make a profit from its expertise in this field.
By turning its attention to the commercial side of nuclear power, General Electric
partially detached itself from government influence in the nuclear field.
General Electric began selling nuclear reactors and creating power plants for
domestic companies on a regular basis during the 1960s. Some of these plants were built
on a “turnkey” basis, meaning that General Electric not only provided all of the products
necessary for a nuclear plant, it was responsible for constructing the plant. 359 Balogh
explains, “Competition between manufactures eager to sell a technology they had already
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invested billions in was clearly one factor prompting the turnkey concept.” 360 For other
plants, General Electric simply provided to customers the reactor and other equipment
necessary for a nuclear power plant.
General Electric accepted the “turnkey” orders initially because they “helped
create a market and establish the nuclear business.” 361 However, during the latter half of
the 1960s, General Electric generally tried to stay away from building plants on a
“turnkey” basis, for the company found that it was more difficult to make a profit on
these sales. Arguably the most significant plant that General Electric provided nuclear
equipment for between 1962 and 1970 was the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA)
plant in northern Alabama. 362 General Electric agreed to a $122 million contract in June
of 1966 to provide nuclear power equipment to the TVA. 363 TVA’s decision to “go
nuclear” was of great importance because the company was one of the largest users of
coal for energy. 364 The Monogram claimed, “TVA’s decision to build a nuclear plant
after an exhaustive study is a big victory for atomic power in its competitive battle with
fossil-fueled stations.” 365
General Electric also made large profits by selling nuclear power equipment to
foreign customers. In May of 1964, the company signed a contract with the government
of India to construct a nuclear power plant for that country. 366 The contract stated that the
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Indian government would pay General Electric $95 million to construct the station and
provide it with nuclear fuel. 367
In order to further its nuclear business on the international front, General Electric
formed jointly owned companies, known as “joint ventures”, with foreign corporations
all over the world. General Electric’s first joint venture was with the German company
Allgemeine Elektrizitas Gesellschaft (AEG). 368 The June 1965 edition of the Monogram
states that their joint venture would “manufacture reactor components and produce
nuclear fuel within the European Common Market.” 369 Predicting that the demand for
electrical power would double within the next decade, General Electric hoped that its
joint venture with AEG would profit by supplying electrical power through nuclear
reactors. 370 General Electric also formed joint ventures with Japanese, Swiss, and Italian
corporations. As of July of 1965, seven atomic power stations were built by these joint
ventures on foreign territory in West Germany, Italy, and Japan, while further stations
were under construction in the Netherlands, India, and West Germany. 371
Although General Electric was now focused on the commercial aspect of nuclear
power, it was still awarded significant research and development contracts from the
government in this field. In March of 1967, General Electric signed two contracts with
the government totaling nearly $2 million to study the design of nuclear plants and
reactors. 372 Furthermore, Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory’s contract with the Atomic
Energy Commission to perform research in the field of naval nuclear propulsion was
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extended by five years in March of 1969. 373 The Monogram explains that General
Electric has operated this laboratory “since the very inception of the naval nuclear
program,” and “trusts that future challenges (supporting the nation’s defense) will be met
and answered with continued success.” 374
General Electric was also focused on improving its own nuclear facilities in order
to boost its position within the nuclear industry. In 1969 the company completed its
construction of a brand new plant in Wilmington, North Carolina. 375 According to the
Monogram, the plant “quadrupled the Nuclear Energy Division’s capacity, making it the
world’s largest plant totally devoted to commercial nuclear reactor component and fuel
production.” 376 Congressmen Chet Holifield, who was the speaker at the Wilmington
plant’s dedication, noted the importance of the plant to the nation as a whole. Holifield
said, “The output from this plant will contribute to the development of nuclear energy as
a vital national resource—a fifth source of needed energy to meet the growing needs of
this nation.” 377
Other government leaders also encouraged General Electric’s entrepreneurship in
the nuclear business. On numerous occasions between 1962 and 1970, American
politicians visited General Electric’s nuclear plants and commended the company for the
work it was doing. For example, during a visit to Hanford Works in October of 1963,
President John F. Kennedy encouraged General Electric employees to “hasten the
development of low cost atomic power” and “take full advantage of technological
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advances in both generating and transmitting electrical energy.” 378 With the help of the
government, General Electric was able to build a full-fledged business in nuclear power.
Defense Business
General Electric continued its steady production of jet engines, missile systems,
and defense electronics for military purposes between 1962 and 1970. Production in these
areas was of particular importance given the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam
War. Many of the defense projects taken on by General Electric during this time period
were long term, which guaranteed continued business between the company and
government on behalf of the military. The expertise and technology developed by
General Electric in its production of jet engines for the military also gave the company a
significant advantage in designing and producing jet engines for commercial airlines
during this period.
General Electric signed several key government contracts for the production of jet
engines between 1962 and 1970. In October of 1963, the Air Force placed a $187 million
order with General Electric for the continued production of J79-15 engines. 379 This was
the largest contract signed between the Air Force and the company since the Korean
War. 380 General Electric received further orders for the production of jet engines in
January of 1965, which totaled over $200 million. 381 In a report from the April 1966
edition of the Monogram, the J79 engine was performing very well under battle
conditions in Vietnam. 382 The report claims that the engine held its own against enemy

378
379
380
381
382

“The President Goes To Hanford,” The General Electric Monogram, October, 1963. p. 10.
“Also, A Big J79 Order,” The General Electric Monogram, October, 1963. p. 6.
Ibid, p. 6.
“Fast Take-off For 1965,” The General Electric Monogram, January, 1965. p. 16.
“Jetpower For Vietnam,” The General Electric Monogram, April, 1966. p. 10.

91
fire, and that unscheduled maintenance of the engine was at a minimum. 383 Furthermore,
the report states that American pilots were very appreciative of the J79-15 engines being
produced by General Electric. One American pilot fighting in Vietnam is quoted as
saying, “The pilots are very staunch J79 men and say that missions they have been flying
make them appreciate the engines more than they had before.” 384
General Electric also continued its work in defense electronics between 1962 and
1970. Early in 1965, two major military electronics orders were received by General
Electric’s Heavy Military Electronics department, which were predicted to “provide a
working base for the department for the next three or four years.” 385 The two contracts
provided by the government aim to improve existing sonar and radar systems for the
military. 386 The radar being developed by General Electric gave American soldiers and
advantage while fighting in Vietnam. According to Tom Paganelli, the general manager
of General Electric’s Heavy Military Electronics Department, “The General Electric
radars in use in Vietnam were designed to give the guy fighting this kind of war a
capability and accuracy not previous available. Continued developments of tactical
electronic equipment will help our fighting men be even more effective.” 387
Further defense work performed by General Electric centered on the Poseidon
missile program. The United States Navy announced in March of 1966 that General
Electric would be receiving up to $80 million over a five-year span in order to develop
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the Poseidon missile system. 388 In a similar fashion to the Polaris missile system, the
Poseidon missile system was to be used by submarines to launch missiles out of the water
and hit targets on land. President Lyndon Johnson described the Poseidon missile system
as “twice as accurate with double the payload of the Polaris missile.” 389 A Poseidon
missile was first launched during the summer of 1968 at Cape Kennedy, and the Navy
deemed the launch “a complete success.” 390 The Monogram states that the Poseidon
missile would be “the keystone of the Navy’s nuclear deterrent for the next decade.” 391
As an offshoot of its defense work, General Electric’s expertise in producing jet
engines for the military helped the company in its development of commercial jet
engines. In August 1962, the Monogram announced that, “Under contract from the
Federal Aviation Agency, the Company will launch major research on designs for a jet
engine which will propel commercial airliners faster than the speed of sound.” 392 In order
to construct such an engine, General Electric hoped to be able to use technology from the
YJ93 engine, which was developed under Air Force contract for the B-70 bomber. 393 The
September 1963 edition of the Monogram revealed that a second generation of the YJ93
engine may be powerful enough to carry out a two-hour transatlantic flight for
commercial airliners. 394
General Electric’s work on a giant turbojet engine, known as the GE4 turbojet,
also opened up avenues of business for the company with commercial airlines. Director
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of the project, Edward E. Hood Jr., claimed in the summer of 1966, “Successful operation
of the GE4 on test and ahead of schedule substantiates our belief that it is feasible to
build a long-life, low-cost, high-performance engine that can be delivered to airlines.” 395
In September of 1966, General Electric submitted its proposal for the engine to the
Federal Aviation Agency. 396 General Electric described its proposal as “a corporate
commitment to the air transportation industry as well as the Government.” 397 The
company ultimately won the contract to build the engine in December of 1966, beating
out competitor United Aircraft Corporation. 398 The government planned to use the GE4
to power a U.S. supersonic airliner “capable of carrying some 300 passengers from New
York to London in two hours and 40 minutes.” 399 The March 1967 edition of the
Monogram states that General Electric’s Evendale plant “took on the biggest competition
ever to create the engines for the supersonic airliner. Financial experts said it couldn’t be
done.” 400
Considered to be “the biggest news of the year” for General Electric in May of
1968, United Airlines chose the McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Airbus as the plane it would
use to carry passengers to their destinations. 401 The McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Airbus
was powered by General Electric’s CF6/36 engines. 402 Describing the CF6 engine,
Edward E. Hood Jr., the general manager of General Electric’s Commercial Engine
Division, said, “We feel the CF6 will be the best jet engine ever to enter commercial
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service. We believe it will set new industry standards for low fuel consumption, long life,
and ease of maintenance.” 403 At the time United Airlines selected the DC-10 Airbus,
General Electric was already “supplying engines to over half the business jets in the air
today.” 404 The selection made by United Airlines guaranteed General Electric that it
would have a steady source of business in commercial aviation for years to come.
General Electric’s defense work continued to benefit itself, the government, and
the military between 1962 and 1970. The company’s defense production by General
Electric helped to supply the military with necessary combat materials for the Vietnam
War, and its aerospace production helped the United States gain significant ground in the
space race with the Soviet Union. Aerospace work was especially important to the
government, for it did not want the United States to be perceived as less technologically
advanced than the Soviet Union.
In the commercial arena, General Electric was able to establish itself as a leader in
nuclear power plant production and jet engine construction. Both of these businesses
spawned from defense research and development performed by the company in the
previous two decades. Even so, General Electric was still hesitant to attribute its growth
and success to work it had performed under government contracts.
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V. Conclusion
An established relationship between the American government and defense
contractors is necessary so that the military is appropriately equipped with necessary
defense materials. However, if this relationship is walled off from the public, the
Military-Industrial Complex has the capability to be detrimental to American society. As
Gordon Adams states in The Iron Triangle, “It (the Military-Industrial Complex)
encourages a narrowing of views and shared expectations that another generation of
weapons is both desirable and inevitable and that defense spending must rise.” 405 Many
of the concerns expressed regarding the Military-Industrial Complex in the literature
review are completely valid. In no way should defense contractors be able to influence
decisions made by government officials concerning the country’s national security.
Similarly, government officials should not award defense contracts for projects that are
wasteful and unnecessary, and the government must be vigilant in its oversight of “costplus” defense contracts to assume that costs are not overstated.
In the case of General Electric, two of the sources I reviewed accuse the company
of the types of abuses described above. Bringing GE To Light argues that General
Electric promoted wasteful spending by the government on nuclear arms so that the
company would increase its profits. At Any Cost portrays General Electric as a corrupt
business that has been convicted of Pentagon fraud on numerous accounts. While these
accusations are disturbing, they relate to business practices of General Electric in the
1980s and 1990s, which is not the period that my thesis is focused on.
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Through my research of General Electric from World War II through 1970, I did
not find any instances where the company was accused of abusing its position within the
Military-Industrial Complex. General Electric clearly competed with other defense
contractors for government contracts, and likely engaged in questionable lobbying
practices at times. However, pinpointing the activities and influence of General Electric
lobbyists during this period is incredibly difficult. As Adams states with respect to
defense lobbying, “Practices of defense contractors were inadequately disclosed” and
“Available information is often inconsistently reported and poorly aggregated and
analyzed.” 406
Regardless of how General Electric obtained its defense work, I believe that the
company, the government, and the military all greatly benefited from working together
from World War II to 1970. General Electric’s defense-oriented research and
development helped the United States remain a military power during this period. In part
because of the efforts of General Electric, the United States military forces were equipped
with the most technologically advanced equipment in the world and the country
developed an arsenal of nuclear weapons and delivery systems that deterred a Soviet
nuclear attack. By contracting General Electric to perform research and development
related to the country’s defense, the government fulfilled its obligation to protect the
nation’s security.
The spillover effect of General Electric’s defense research and development was
that the company was able to apply military technologies to commercial jet engine
production and new consumer products, and was able to develop nuclear power plants to
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produce electricity. These advancements benefited society as a whole, and would not
have been possible without the funding provided to General Electric by the government
for defense research and development. With the help of its defense production, General
Electric’s sales increased from $1.2 billion in 1945 to $8.7 billion in 1970.
Through my research, I would argue that General Electric should not be criticized
for its role within the Military-Industrial Complex from World War II through 1970. Yes,
the company may have grown at the expense of its competitors, and in its public
statements, it consistently and misleadingly downplayed the benefits it gained from its
defense work. However, the beneficial ways in which General Electric impacted
American society outweigh these negatives.
General Electric played a key role in building and maintaining a strong American
military during a critical period of the country’s history. Further, many commercial
products created by General Electric as an offshoot of its defense work helped to raise the
American consumer’s standard of living and make life more enjoyable. All in all, I view
General Electric’s involvement in the Military-Industrial Complex from World War II
through 1970 as tremendous beneficial to the company itself, and as essential to the
protection and security, of the United States as a whole.
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